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ABSTRACT 
J. L. Addison: Imaginary Friends: Art, Ethical Criticism, and Moral Perception 
(Under the direction of Ram Neta) 
 
 People engage in ethical discussion involving narrative art often. So often that it's really 
quite commonplace. They'll argue with one another over whether the villain of a movie was 
really as wrong as her eventual comeuppance seems to imply, whether protagonists should have 
taken certain actions, whether the structure of a fictional government is a just one, and so on. 
One person might criticize a movie for its portrayal of women, but another find the diversity of 
the cast to be "too politically correct." So too might the staging of a play be criticized for being 
unsafe for its actors, or a movie for its treatment of its cast members, human or animal. Further 
examples abound. 
 This dissertation deals with two kinds of ethical criticism, that share in common a 
concern with the content of narrative works. I argue that the traditional way of understanding 
the ethical value of engagement with narrative art misconstrues the practice of ethical criticism, 
and furthermore that this traditional view is subject to two powerful objections: the cognitive 
triviality argument and the anti-mimicry argument. In lieu of the traditional view, I propose an 
alternative way of understanding engagement with narrative art that avoids these objections and 
better explains and justifies our practice of narrative-content ethical criticism.  
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People engage in ethical discussion involving narrative art often. So often that it's really 
quite commonplace. They'll argue with one another over whether the villain of a movie was 
really as wrong as her eventual comeuppance seems to imply, whether protagonists should have 
taken certain actions, whether the structure of a fictional government is a just one, and so on. 
One person might criticize a movie for its portrayal of women, but another find the diversity of 
the cast to be "too politically correct." So too might the staging of a play be criticized for being 
unsafe for its actors, or a movie for its treatment of its cast members, human or animal. Further 
examples abound. 
All of these ways of assessing art are in some sense ethical. But not all are the same kind of 
ethical assessment. My focus in this project is going to be on a particular type of ethical criticism, 
typified by the following two cases: 
Case 1: After watching the movie The Watchmen, Penelope and Harpreet disagree about 
which of the characters acted rightly in response to an important moral dilemma. 
Harpreet argues that the film’s villain, Ozymandias, was justified in his actions, and that 
the film got it wrong when it made him the villain. Penelope thinks this is outrageous, and 
that Ozymandias was coldhearted and evil.  
 
Case 2: Daisy and Adam both agree that the heist movie they just watched was pretty 
good. Daisy thinks it would have been better if some of the team members were women, 
though, since it wouldn’t have changed anything fundamental about the story, but would 
have done something to help ameliorate what she sees as a dearth of women in interesting 
action roles in movies generally. What’s more, she sees the continual failure of film to do 
this as a moral failing on the part of filmmakers and major studios. 
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I will show that these cases, which might initially seem to be rather different, are actually 
of fundamentally the same type of ethical criticism, one that is (a) concerned with the internal 
features of a work of art in a specific way, and (b) at least sometimes counts as aesthetic, in 
addition to ethical, criticism. I will further argue, against two objections from the literature, that 
this type of ethical criticism is a legitimate enterprise.  
The first section of the project sets up what I call the Traditional View of Ethical 
criticism, a view on which the primary moral value of narrative fiction is in the conveyance of a 
moral “thesis” or a “lesson”—some proposition or other that engagement with the fiction can 
teach us. On the Traditional View, the locus of ethical criticism is these theses: we can criticize a 
work for endorsing a bad thesis, or praise it for endorsing a good one. One reason we might want 
to do this, on the Traditional View, is because it would be bad if people went around believing 
the bad theses and acting in accordance with them.  
Having set up this view, I proceed to raise two objections to it from the literature on 
ethical criticism: the cognitive triviality argument and the anti-mimicry argument. The first of 
these is an objection about the value of the moral theses we derive from fictions: the proponent of 
cognitive triviality thinks that if such theses are the extent of the moral value of fictions, then 
fictions are not very morally-valuable at all, because the theses tend to be trivial, platitudinous, 
and in many cases already known to anyone capable of deriving them from the work. The anti-
mimicry objector, on the other hand, holds that the putative consequences of engaging with 
ethically-questionable narratives are drastically overstated at best, and if concern for the behavior 
of audiences is supposed to justify the practice of ethical criticism, then the practice is unjustified.  
The majority of the project is spent defending the practice of ethical criticism against 
these objections. I do not do this by exposing some fault in the criticisms, but by offering an 
account of both the moral value of fiction and the significant consequences of engagement with it 
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that are not subject to the objections. I defend a Nussbaum-Booth view of the value of narrative 
art, which claims that a central value of fiction is—rather than its assertion of a ‘moral thesis’—its 
ability to cultivate our moral perceptions. Further, I claim that it does this though a process of 
guidance, in which the audience is engaged with the work and guided to notice certain features of 
the people, worlds, and situations in it. This, I show, avoids the cognitive triviality objection.  
Against the anti-mimicry objection, I argue that there is reason to be concerned with the 
consequences of our engagement with narrative works. However, these consequences are not 
straightforwardly individual and behavioral, as the Traditional View suggests. Rather, they are 
diffuse, and importantly social. I argue that we should be concerned with the impact of narrative 
art on the social imaginary, also called the collective hermeneutical resource, and that concerns 
of this type do not fall to the same straightforward empirical refutation as the individual 
behavioral consequences implied by the Traditional View.  
Having defended an account that avoids both objections, I return to the initial cases of 
ethical criticism presented above, and aim to show that what unites them as a type of ethical 
criticism is that they are best understood as centrally concerned with guidance, and that this fact 
makes it the case that they are, sometimes, aesthetic1 in addition to ethical criticisms, as guidance 
is itself an internal feature of a narrative work that can and often does affect our aesthetic 
judgement of it. 
Finally, I will explore the implications of my account of ethical criticism for some related 
questions. Specifically, I will show that there are upshots for a question about the art/artist 
																																																								
1     I take for granted here that there is a distinctive category of aesthetic value, and that there therefore could be 
flaws in a work that are distinctively aesthetic. In general, ‘aesthetic flaws’ are flaws in something qua the kind of 
work that it is. Aesthetic flaws in paintings could be things like poor color choice, or sloppy technique. Aesthetic 
flaws in narrative could be one-dimensional characters, boring or predictable plots, or overly-purple prose, just for a 
few examples. Whether or not ethical flaws are ever flaws qua the kind of artwork that something is is an interesting 
question, and I’ll have a few (suggestive, but not especially definitive) things to say about it later. 
	 4	
distinction, and what I call the epistemic criticism of art. I argue that, at least in some cases, 
assuming the complete separation of art from artist is implausible, and that it is likely that much 
of what I say about ethical criticisms of narratives could be applied in ‘epistemic’ cases as well. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF ETHICAL CRITICISM, AND ITS 
OBJECTIONS 
 
In this section of the project, I begin by explicating the Traditional View of Ethical 
Criticism. I suggest its explanation of Case 1 and Case 2, and then raise two existing objections to 
it that I take to be decisive against it: the cognitive triviality objection and the anti-mimicry 
objection.  
 
1.1 The Traditional View 
Discussion of the assigned readings in my high school English classrooms often prompted 
the students to search for what the author was really saying with the book, or the events in it. We 
read closely (or not so closely) and tried to divine the moral of the story, as it were. In some cases 
(1984, Lord of the Flies) the moral was practically explicit in the text. Let’s suppose for the sake of 
argument that one moral thesis contained within Lord of the Flies is that human beings are innately 
selfish and violent, and that the structure and authority of civilization are necessary for them to 
do well.  
The Traditional View of Ethical Criticism holds that such theses are the proper object of 
ethical criticism. They are, in some sense, what the book is saying, or what we might, in the good 
cases, learn from it. And it is this—the learning—in which the moral value of a work of art 
consists. There may of course be more than one thesis per work, and it’s possible also that we 	
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might learn from some more direct, general moral assertions made in the text as well as from the 
more implicit ones we derive in the way high schoolers are taught to. But the basic idea is that a 
work of fiction contains theses (stated or implied), and in engaging with the fiction we come to 
learn them in the good case and not to do so in the bad cases,1 such as when such a thesis is 
incorrect, or when whatever individual conditions are otherwise required for ‘learning’ the thesis 
are not met.2 
So the Traditional View is composed of two separate but related claims. The first is that 
central to the activity of engaging with a narrative is a process of deriving certain thematic 
statements, of a kind with my crude statement of the theme of Lord of the Flies, above. Peter 
Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen hold this view: 
…it is a defining convention of literary practice that the author should produce and the 
reader search for a humanly interesting content. It is arguable that this content can be 
formulated in a series of ‘reflections’ or ‘thematic statements’, generalizations over the 
characters, situations, events, actions, plots, etc. which are presented at the literal level of 
the work. These reflections state the theme of the work. ‘Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar 
presents the futility of opposing the forces of history through individual human action’, 
would be such a thematic statement. But the reader does not always have to interpret the 
work himself. Sometimes the author generalizes the significance of the situations he 
presents.3 
 
The centrality that Lamarque and Olson accord to this feature of literature carries 
through their entire monograph, and figures prominently in their final account of the value of it. 
However, though they hold that these thematic statements are central to ‘literary practice,’ 
including literary criticism, they do not take the further step of holding that such statements are 
																																																								
1     In one type of bad case we do not come to believe the theses, and in another sort, we do come to believe them, 
but as they are false, no such belief constitutes learning.  
 
2    Maybe, for example, we already know it, or perhaps we’re too tired to pay enough attention to recognize that the 
thesis is there, or what-have you. 
 
3     Truth, Fiction, and Literature (1994), 285. 
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ethically-evaluable theses, because they don’t think that such statements are meaningfully 
evaluated for their truth, because they don’t think that literature is in the business of truth at all. 
So they don’t hold the Traditional View writ large.  
Holding the Traditional View requires adding to this view about what is central in 
narrative engagement a view about how these ‘thematic statements’ ought to be themselves 
engaged with or evaluated. The Traditional View holds that they’re truth-evaluable, and because 
of this ethically-evaluable, and that doing this kind of evaluation of them is at least not completely 
missing the point of narrative engagement.4 
It seems plausible to me to attribute the Traditional View to Aristotle, who in the Poetics 
has the following to say about the poets (which we may generalize to creators of narrative more 
broadly-construed): 
…it is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen—
what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity. The poet and the 
historian differ not by writing in verse or in prose. […] The true difference is that one 
relates what has happened, the other what may happen. Poetry, therefore, is a more 
philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, 
history the particular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on 
occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity; and it is this 
universality at which poetry aims in the names she attaches to the personages.5 
 
This language of what may happen ‘according to the law of probability or necessity’ as 
well as the reference to poetry as a ‘more philosophical and higher’ thing than history, which is 
very much in the business of stating truths, suggests that poetry too is in the business of stating 
truths—but the truths in question are universal, more general than the particular truths conveyed 
																																																								
4     I say ‘at least not completely missing the point’ because there is room here for a range of views about how closely 
related this sort of ethical assessment is to the activity of, say, reading a story or watching a movie. It could be largely 
unrelated but at least a coherent thing to do (which Lamarque and Olson’s view seems to deny), or it could be so 
close as to be itself central to the experience. Simply holding a version of the Traditional View does not commit 
anyone to the claim that ethical assessment is central to the experience. 
 
5     Poetics, 1451b. 
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by historical accounts. Indeed, just how well poetry does this, and what combinations of literary 
elements are better or worse for this purpose are the subject of much of Aristotle’s subsequent 
discussion of the tragic form. 
Of course, that poetry is for Aristotle in the business of conveying general truths does not 
yet establish that these truths are ethical, but that poetry deals centrally with ethics is an 
assumption that saturates the Poetics.  
The perfect tragedy should… imitate actions which excite pity and fear, this being the 
distinctive mark of tragic imitation. It follows… that the change of fortune presented must 
not be the spectacle of the virtuous man brought from prosperity to adversity: for this 
moves neither pity nor fear; it merely shocks us. Nor, again, that of a bad man passing 
from adversity to prosperity: for nothing can be more alien to the spirit of Tragedy; it 
possesses no single tragic quality; it neither satisfies the moral sense, nor calls forth pity or 
fear. […] There remains, then, the character between these two extremes—that of a man 
who is not eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or 
depravity, but by some error or frailty. He must be one who is highly renowned and 
prosperous—a personage like Oedipus, Thyestes, or other illustrious men of such 
families.6 
 
The well-written tragedy, for Aristotle, must not only relate ‘what may happen’ in some 
morally-neutral predictive sense. What it relates must also ‘satisfy the moral sense’; the general 
truths conveyed to us by poetry have at least sometimes as their subject matter matters of 
character and good or bad fortunes, and what they have to say about such matters is clearly 
properly subject to critique if it gets the ethical dimensions wrong.7 He takes it to be aimed at 
making true statements, many of which will be ethical in nature or import. What we derive from 
a narrative isn’t merely a set of thematic statements, but a set of theses, and these are every bit as 
truth-evaluable as any set of philosophical theses.8  
																																																								
6     Ibid, 1453a. 
 
7     E.g. if it presents as tragic the downfall of a villain. 
 
8     I owe this terminology to Lamarque and Olsen, who in turn attribute it to Beardsley (1981). 
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More modern iterations of the Traditional View are essentially similar. Sartre, while 
against what he characterizes as bourgeois notions of ‘message,’ wherein what literature should 
do is deliver a sterile, already-accepted kind of thesis that is easily left behind after reading, 
nonetheless takes reading to be a form of reasoning: “Reading is induction, interpolation, 
extrapolation…”9 and writing is saying something.10 What’s more, this kind of saying and 
reasoning is strongly bound up in ethics: 
Thus, there are only good novels and bad novels. The bad novel aims to please by 
flattering, whereas the good one is an exigence and an act of faith. […] It would be 
inconceivable that this unleashing of generosity provoked by the writer could be used to 
authorize an injustice, and that the reader could enjoy his freedom while reading a work 
which approves or accepts or simply abstains from condemning the subjection of man by 
man.11 
 
Sartre seems to claim here that a “good novel” could not possibly endorse an ethically-repugnant 
thesis—could not be used to “authorize an injustice.” This is not a requirement of the 
Traditional View, by any means, but its association with positions like this has been part of the 
reason it’s met with objections.12 
Gerald Graff holds a version of the view as well, writing that though it can be 
irresponsible to distill a ‘message’ completely independent of its context in a work, nevertheless there are 
substantive statements to be found in them, and that these are proper objects of criticism: 
Can there be no distinction at all, then, between literary works and other kinds of 
“communicative projects”? Obviously, there has to be, but the kinds of distinctions which 
have been advanced have been greatly exaggerated. It is possible to make purely 
“intrinsic” judgments of literature, judgements that suspend all question of truth or belief. 
																																																								
9     Jean-Paul Sartre, “What is Literature?” in “What is Literature?” and Other Essays. Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press (1988). 60 
 
10     Ibid, 38. 
 
11     Ibid, 67. 
 
12     Noël Carroll, “Art and Ethical Criticism: An Overview of Recent Directions of Research.” Ethics 110 (2), 2000, 
pp. 350-387, 353	
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There may be no great novels glorifying cannibalism, but if one imagines an assortment 
of such novels, one can suppose that some will be better as novels than others. […] 
Internal coherence may well be a necessary condition of literary value. But it can hardly 
be a sufficient condition. […] The appreciation of the intrinsic qualities of such works for 
most readers will be retarded by the radical violation of extrinsic norms these works 
entail.  
 
[…] Nor does it follow that literary themes make some specially softened kind of truth-
claim or no truth-claim at all. Even a work which asserts that truth is totally problematic, 
unknowable, relative, or a function of multiple perspectives makes the same kind of truth 
claim as do such examples outside of literature.13  
 
Versions of the Traditional View of Ethical Criticism14 also imply something about their 
proper level of assessment. In particular, they are concerned with what is conveyed to particular 
readers, or ‘audiences’, where these are simple aggregates of more than one particular reader. 
When earlier I expressed the view as being about ethical theses that we learn, I meant ‘we’ in this 
simple aggregate sense. I might, and you might, and Mary might, but the process is at its core 
individual, and so this is the level at which we should focus our attention—what happens to 
individuals. 
If what happens when we engage with literature is partly that we come to believe ethical 
theses, and the sense of ‘we’ is merely a pluralization of individual cases, then the Traditional 
View seems to hold that we at least sometimes arrive at belief in ethical theses through 
engagement with literature. This, in turn, could have direct consequences for our behavior, as 
the belief in ethical theses sometimes does. Some holders of traditional views—like Plato—in fact 
take for granted that hearing certain stories will cause us to behave in certain ways.15 Critics 
																																																								
13     Gerald Graff, Literature Against Itself: Literary Ideas in Modern Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (1979). 
162 
 
14     Interestingly, this view is also expressed in such places as contemporary manuals on writing craft, such as Truby 
(2007) and McKee (1997). It’s likely fair to say that this is the prevailing view among people who write narrative 
works, if they take themselves to be doing anything ethical at all. 
 
15     See the discussion in Book III of the Republic. 
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charge that even versions of the view that are not explicit about its relation to behavior imply 
this.16 
 
1.2 The Traditional View and the cases 
The Traditional View doesn’t do too badly at explaining the first case. We could take the 
disagreement between Penelope and Harpreet to be something like the following: ultimately, a or 
the moral thesis of the film The Watchmen is that actions like Ozymandias’s, which are utilitarian 
to the point of heartlessness, are wrong. Harpreet simply disagrees with this thesis, and the film 
didn’t convince him of it. Penelope, on the other hand, agrees, and may have found the film to 
be an apt demonstration of why. 
The second case is different. It seems that on the Traditional View there’s no good way to 
make sense of Daisy’s criticism. Unless one wanted to say that the exclusion of women from the 
cast amounted to a ‘moral thesis’ that women couldn’t be part of highly-specialized heist teams 
(which seems absurd), it’s not clear what she’s supposed to be criticizing here. Likely, the holder 
of the Traditional View will need a separate explanation for what Daisy is doing, one on which 
she is perhaps ethically criticizing the filmmaking industry, or the film’s production, rather than the 
movie itself. And the same would have to be said about criticisms of ‘representation’ in general. 
When such critics argue that it is important for, e.g., women or people of color to be able to ‘see 
themselves’ in various roles17, the critique can’t be of actual pieces of narrative, unless those 
																																																								
16     I don’t rule out the possibility that there is some version of the Traditional View that doesn’t imply anything 
about behavior, but in all the examples cited, the behavioral consequences are not discussed. Given the fact that 
propositional beliefs often have a direct effect on behavior, it would seem to be a reasonable charge on the part of 
the critics to say the Traditional View implies this, in the absence of arguments to the contrary. 
 
17				Cf. Hood (2015), Montalvo (2016), Epstein (2017), Cunningham (2013), Adichie (2009). 
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narratives happen to actually have the thesis ‘such-and-such a sort of person can’t do x.’ And 
outside of particularly sexist or racist narratives, that’s unlikely. So such critiques must really be 
about something else, namely something like film overall or Hollywood in particular, or 
something like that. 
So on the Traditional View, it seems like the two cases don’t count as the same type of 
ethical criticism. This itself is not necessarily a strike against the Traditional View. But in 
answering the objections that are strikes against the Traditional View, it will become apparent 
that the cases in fact are of the same type. I move now to the objections. 
 
1.3 The cognitive triviality argument 
There are several arguments against the fittingness of the moral evaluation of art in 
general. I have something to say about two of them in particular: the cognitive triviality 
argument and the argument from anticonsequentialism.18  
Recall that, on the Traditional View, the moral value, if any, in narrative lies in its moral 
thesis, which is a sort of organizing principle under which the rest of the work might be 
understood, derived from the text by interpretation (or sometimes just outright stated). The 
trouble with this, says the skeptic about ethical criticism, is that if true, such theses are surely so 
basic as to be almost trivial. Jerome Stolnitz gives a version of this criticism: 
Because novels and plays… spend most of their time on… other matters, the truths 
elicited from them are usually tangential, inchoate, vague, which may explain, in part, 
why they often seem to enjoy a weight of suggestiveness greater than they are entitled to. 
Such truths do not require specialists. The artist may chance to have first-hand 
knowledge—Dickens was a law reporter; most often, as Plato, an arch-cognitivist, 
complained, he does not. But it is not by virtue of such knowledge that he is an artist. And 
even when such knowledge shapes the work of art, it is not […] the work of art that 
																																																								
18     I follow Carroll in using these terms.  
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confirms. We may see why, for all the talk of artistic truth, there has been fairly little talk 
of artistic knowledge.19 
 
What’s more, reading a thesis into a narrative work seems to require already taking it to 
be true, or at least entertaining the possibility that it is. Someone who doesn’t believe it is likely to 
interpret the ethical thesis of the book quite differently, rather than come to understand this truth 
via reading it. 
Noël Carroll writes: 
This line of attack is really a subsidiary of an even broader complaint about art criticism. 
Art critics often write as though artworks were contributions to knowledge, including, in 
the case at hand, moral knowledge. In this way, critics treat art as if it were comparable to 
science—a mode of inquiry. However, the skeptic maintains that the putative cognitive 
accomplishments of art are paltry, especially when compared to science. Artworks, more 
often than not, presuppose articles of common knowledge or philosophy, recycling them, 
perhaps imaginatively, but hardly discovering them. If artworks are to be commended for 
their contribution of genuinely original insights to our body of knowledge, very few 
artworks would be worthy of our esteem. And what applies to artworks with respect to 
knowledge in general, applies equally to artworks with respect to moral knowledge. If 
James’s Ambassadors shows the importance of acute perceptual discrimination for moral 
reflection, well, Aristotle already demonstrated that.20 
 
And if what artworks are doing is showing to us what has already been demonstrated, 
then it seems that their potential for moral edification is eroded. Especially if, as suggested above, 
understanding what the insight of a work of art is often involves already possessing that insight. 
The information in such a case is not only trivial and already known in some general sense, but 
already known to the audience. If this is what’s going on, then art doesn’t seem to have much to 
recommend it, morally speaking. And if that’s so, the argument goes, then whatever value it has 
must not be moral value. This is the argument from cognitive triviality. 
																																																								
19     Jerome Stolnitz, “On the Cognitive Triviality of Art,” British Journal of Aesthetics, 32: 3 (July 1992) pp. 191-200. 
Reprinted in Lamarque and Olsen (eds.), Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art – The Analytic Tradition, pp. 337-343. 341 
 
20    Carroll, 354. 
	 14	
 
1.4 The anti-mimicry argument 
The argument from anticonsequentialism resembles the argument from cognitive 
triviality in that it starts from the manner in which ethical criticism tends to proceed, be that 
criticism in a high school classroom or elsewhere. Take a common ethical critique of action 
movies or first-person shooter video games, for instance: they are bad because they “encourage 
violence.” The thought that underlies such a complaint seems to be this: the moral valence of art 
is at least in part determined by what behaviors it may encourage or discourage in the audience. 
This was certainly Plato’s explicit concern, and it is echoed in statements of modern advocacy 
groups.21 As mentioned, it appears to be at least a reasonable inference from other statements of 
the Traditional View as well.  
The ‘anticonsequentialist,’ I think more precisely referred to as the ‘anti-mimic,’22 takes 
issue with this kind of evaluation. Namely, they argue that the ethical critic is making very 
spurious claims about the behavioral consequences of action movies and video games. How does 
the critic know that violent media encourages violence? The claim is straightforwardly empirical, 
and the research on it it is infamously thin and inconclusive.23  
Carroll again: 
For centuries, ethical criticism of the arts has proceeded confidently, as if we knew the 
behavioral effects of art on its audiences. However, no one really possesses reliable 
knowledge of the relevant order of specificity concerning art’s behavioral consequences, 
																																																								
21     For just one example, see the AAFP’s position statement on media violence. 
(https://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/violence-media.html) 
 
22      This term is also quite imperfect for its purpose, but I think it at least less likely to end in confusions regarding 
consequentialism writ large. 
 
23     Carroll, 356. Worth noting is that there is some evidence that consistent exposure to media violence has effects, 
but only on some people, some of the time, maybe. It’s an interesting data point, but not nearly strong enough to 
support the critic who is concerned about mimicry. 
 
	 15	
nor do we have any dependable means for predicting the regularly recurring pattern of 
social behavior that any artwork will elicit—either in the short or the long run—from 
normal viewers, listeners, and/or readers. Anyone who claims to have access to this 
information, as participants in this debate often do, is simply bluffing. Inasmuch as ethical 
criticism of the arts rides on the possession of such knowledge about the behavioral 
consequences of art, the project is doubtworthy.24 
 
As long as part of the argument for the ethical criticism of art rests on an empirically-
shaky behavioral premise like this, it has a major weakness. Short of more decisive empirical 
research, the way to save ethical criticism must be removing this dependence, or showing that it 
was never there to begin with. If any part of the pro-ethical-evaluation position is to be 
consequentialist in a more general sense, the consequences must be for something else.  
I take these objections to be sufficiently damning to the Traditional View. If I am to 
maintain that the type of ethical criticism I am concerned about is legitimate, I will need to find a 
different basis for the moral value of narrative fictions, as well as a different way of thinking about 
the consequences of engagement with them. I take these desiderata one by one below, beginning 
with an account of the moral value of fictions. 
	
																																																								
24     Ibid. 
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2. THE DISCERNING-WITH FRIENDS VIEW AND COGNITIVE TRIVIALITY 
 
 
In this chapter, I defend an account of moral learning from fictions propounded by 
Martha Nussbaum. Roughly: the moral value of fictions consists in the ability they have not to 
convey some propositional sort of moral truth, but rather their ability to refine our moral 
perceptions by presenting us with complex ‘pictures.’ In response to a possible objection to the 
account, I argue that in addition to presenting a picture, a work of narrative art guides the reader’s 
viewing of that picture, inviting them to notice particular features or to have certain responses to 
what is presented.   
In order to gauge the plausibility of this account, a developed notion of ‘guiding’ is 
needed. Specifically: what it is for a work of fiction to invite a certain response from a reader, or 
guide a reader to that response. Here, I’ll give a sketch of a Nussbaum-esque ‘learning from 
fiction’ account, and then supplement this by providing more on the question of guided 
responses. I argue, following Wayne Booth, that the guide in question is an implied author of 
sorts, distinct from the flesh-and-blood author, and that this author guides moral perception 
through a variety of literary techniques. The total synthesized view, I call the ‘Discerning-with-
friends’ account. 
Further, I argue that engagement in this process of being guided is part of the distinctive 
aesthetic experience of narrative forms of art, and that such engagement is not merely an 
incidental but a central part of the aesthetic experience of reading, watching, or listening to a 
narrative. Given both this type of engagement’s centrality and its distinctively ethical character, I 	
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will further argue that the way in which narratives guide the development of our moral 
discernment, or in more Boothian terms, the kinds of ‘friends’ narrative works are, is a proper 
object of the ethical criticism of narrative art. 
 
2.1 The faculty of moral perception, and learning from fiction 
Martha Nussbaum1 holds that being moral requires two things: knowledge of the moral 
rules, and a certain perceptual or perception-esque faculty. She characterizes such perceptions 
with both rich metaphors and plainer language, referring to them as ‘alert winged creatures 
perched on the heads of’ the monolithic ‘standing terms’’ (the rules). I’ll follow Nussbaum in 
referring to this faculty in one of two ways: moral perception or moral discernment.2  
In this sort of moral ontology, the perceptions are separate from the rules, without 
displacing them.3 A useful analogy here is with an actress in the midst of an improvisation. In 
order to improvise well, the actress must be capable of picking up on the nuances and cues in her 
partner’s performance—she must be especially sensitive and responsive to them. This is one of 
the fundamental skills of improvisation, after which she must respond accordingly and carry on 
the performance. But she is not free, if she wants to improvise well, to respond in any way 
whatsoever. There are standing conventions of genre, performance in general, and so on, that 
limit the number of ways she might continue.4  
																																																								
1     Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge. (1990) New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
2     I treat these terms as equivalent. 
 
3     Nussbaum takes this to be a relation of priority; for her the perceptions are prior to the rules. (Ibid., 38). I do not 
share this particular commitment; for my purposes it is enough that the two are distinct. 
 
4    Ibid, 94. 
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In this manner too are perception and rule meant to interact. The moral agent is like the 
actress in the improvisation. It is vital that they be able to pick up the subtle and ‘irreducibly 
particular’5 features of a situation in order to respond correctly, but it is not true that the 
acceptable range of responses is determined only by the perceived particulars. The rules are still 
there, and in an important sense they delineate the range of acceptable responses. But acting 
rightly is in part a matter of perceiving rightly—perceiving well.  
This account produces a schism between what moral philosophy can do and what must 
be done elsewhere. The natural domain of moral philosophy, thinks Nussbaum, is with the rules. 
Moral philosophy can work out what the rules are, and this is certainly a vitally important thing 
to do. But the refinement of moral perception is also important, and this, she thinks philosophy is 
ill-suited for. No philosophical example, given in plain language with scant detail and focused 
perhaps on a handful of nuances at most, can do much to refine perception.6  
Suppose, by analogy, that we are trying to help a friend of ours refine his visual 
perception. (Say that he is regularly quite inattentive and not very observant.) In such a case, we 
can in the manner of philosophers offer him advice on what to do. We can say “try scanning every 
new room from left to right slowly” or “pay attention to changes in color or sudden movements” 
or things of this kind. But such general advice is, on Nussbaum’s view, a far less effective method 
of cultivation than our friend would gain if he simply practiced looking at things: entire scenes, in 
all the complexity of life, from someone’s kitchen to the Grand Canyon, and devoted himself to 
better directing his attention and observing his surroundings.  
																																																								
5    Ibid, 155. 
 
6    Ibid, 157. 
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In the same way, we philosophers might be able to tell someone, in general terms, what 
the morally-salient features of a situation are likely to be, or where he ought to direct his attention 
to get the gist of things, but the cultivation of a refined ability to discern such features is best 
gained through being presented with ‘pictures’—situations vivid and rich in their complexity, 
and not capturable in the crisp, precise language that is suitable to philosophy. 
This kind of perception can, however, be cultivated by interaction with art, or at least 
some art. The idea here is meant to be that a writer of fictions, if they are of considerable skill, 
can create just the kind of pictures that one can study to cultivate one’s faculty of discernment. 
And they can do so in a way that is lost when those same pictures are rendered in philosophical 
paraphrase.  
While I think Nussbaum is probably right about this—that literature in particular can 
help us cultivate our moral perception in a way that philosophy cannot and that this constitutes a 
very good reason to see art and philosophy as partners in the same enterprise—I don’t think one 
need take this position to think that at the very least art can help cultivate moral discernment. 
Whether it does so better than philosophy is in some sense practically irrelevant: the number of 
people who engage with art is vastly greater than the number of people who engage with moral 
philosophy, and that is reason enough to care about how art does this. 
As long as there is some faculty or other of moral perception, and this faculty when 
cultivated is better than when uncultivated, there’s reason to look into how it develops. This is 
not as straightforward as it might at first seem. In the next section, I’ll lay out a pair of issues 





2.2 The conundrum of discernment, and ‘guided perception’ 
Nussbaum’s account suggests that literature (or, more broadly, narrative art of any sort) is 
useful for cultivating moral perception in that it presents us with rich ‘pictures.’ In studying these 
pictures, we refine the skill of picking out morally-salient features in complicated situations which 
at least somewhat accurately resemble features and situations we might encounter in life.  
But here is a conundrum: if such a picture, whether in real life or in fiction, is set before a 
person who does not already possess a refined faculty of discernment, what good is it that the 
picture is rich? In other words, isn’t it the case that by the time something like a fiction enters the 
equation, the subject must already have this faculty of discernment, or else get nothing from the 
‘picture’ beyond what they’re already capable of gleaning?  
There is of course a sense here in which the answer is yes. Rich, complex pictures are not 
going to do much good for people who have as yet no discernment at all. And perhaps at some 
point in the development of this capacity, something like the rough general guidelines of moral 
philosophy might be more helpful. But Nussbaum’s point isn’t that always and everywhere for everyone 
literature is better for cultivating this capacity—only that at some point in the development of the 
capacity it’s useful. There might be agents who never reach this point. There are certainly some, 
perhaps most young children, who could reach this point but have not yet.  
But suppose an agent has reached a point at which general guidelines about morally-
relevant features of situations have taken their moral perception as far as they alone can. How 
now do they further develop this capacity of theirs? 
The answer, on an account like Nussbaum’s, could be ‘by engaging with the right sort of 
narratives.’ Of course, it could also be ‘by engaging in life’! While this is certainly true, I submit 








The advantage of distance is one Nussbaum herself points to.7 We are, of course, partial to 
ourselves, and in our everyday lives most of the vivid sorts of scenario right for the cultivation of 
our moral perceptions will involve ourselves, or at least people we are close and partial to. These 
are the scenarios in which we will have the most information about the emotional life of the 
subjects, their particular histories and contexts and so on. This can make discernment especially 
difficult, as we are not very good at levelly considering whether or not we might be in the wrong. 
At a minimum, we’re typically better at making such judgements about other people than 
ourselves or our closest loved ones. Fiction provides such a distance. While in the course of 
reading one might well come to have emotional attitudes about the goings on, they are still 
certainly not our goings-on, and this is appropriate to the sort of enterprise Nussbaum has in 
mind. 
Of course, this does require in the reader a certain capacity to achieve such a distance. It 
might well be that some of us are less skilled at it than others. Nevertheless, I think it true that, 
however good we are or are not at this kind of rational distancing from partiality in general, it is 
easier to do with fiction than with actual cases involving ourselves. The advantage will probably 
be greatest for those of us who can relinquish our partiality but are not particularly excellent at it, 
since if we were particularly excellent, we would presumably be able to do so in our own case, 
and if we were altogether incapable, the fact that we could not in a reading be partial to ourselves 
might not much matter. But such cases, if they exist, would I think be extremely rare. 
																																																								
7     Ibid, 162 
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The advantage of information shores up a weakness of distance. Typically, when confronted 
by complex situations that call for moral evaluation in life, we don’t know as much about the 
circumstances of strangers as we do about our own. But in a fiction, we can know a great deal 
about ‘strangers,’ up to most or all of the morally-salient details.8 Having more complete pictures 
with more facets to weigh and consider is, I think, analogous to having a puzzle with more pieces: 
a more difficult case that will improve one’s puzzle-solving abilities to a greater degree than one 
with fewer. 
This advantage, plausibly, degrades the more abstract the novel becomes. Some authors 
purposefully give relatively little information about what is going on. On this account, such works 
are best treated as, one might say, advanced cases, or difficult pictures, and perhaps by the time 
we can really get much out of them, we have become more skilled at the interpretation of 
narratives. Our skill then allows us to get enough information out of the text to be meaningfully 
guided, whereas perhaps someone in need of more information would get little from a highly-
abstract narrative.9 
The advantage of safety is double-sided. Engaging and thinking through fictions in this 
way is something with relatively few potential consequences. It doesn’t matter terribly if I misread 
the intentions and situation of Desdemona and Othello and come to believe that his smothering 
of her is justified. It might say something rather awful about me, but in itself it doesn’t harm 
much of anything. If, on the other hand, I misread a similar situation in life, any number of bad 
things could happen: I could refuse to vote guilty on a jury, I could encourage someone in a 
																																																								
8    Ideally. There are of course a range of interesting non-ideal cases, but these are particular enough that I don’t think 
I have much to say about them systematically. Suffice it to say for now that this is all under an assumption of a great 
deal of both skill and clarity on the behalf of the writer. More on this later. 
 
9     It is also the case that not every narrative need be morally-improving (or degrading) in some way. Some abstract 
novels still could be, by way of being ‘hard cases’, but others will not be.  
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similar situation to emulate the tactics (hopefully without getting caught), and so on. This is of 
course a far-fetched case, and I don’t mean to suggest that most consequences of a moral 
misperception would be so grievous, but nevertheless I might inadvertently cause harm of some 
kind to someone if I don’t responsibly cultivate my moral perception. There is safety in fictions 
for me in that I can mull things over and consider hypotheses and re-evaluate later without ever 
needing to hang anything on the rightness of my judgement, and safety for others in the same. 
And then there’s the advantage of accessibility. It’s quite true that few of us are ever likely 
to be directly faced with life and death situations, large-scale decisions about the governance of 
the state, or all that many genuine, wrenching moral dilemmas. But these things are readily 
found in fictions. Likewise, fictions can expose us to people that we don’t typically get to interact 
with: few of us will meet many Syrian refugees, for instance. In some parts of the country, one is 
unlikely to ever meet many people of color, either. Art, and narrative art in particular, is a 
window into the lives of others, and it is relatively easy to come by. 
It would not be unreasonable to have an accuracy concern here. Accessible though such 
‘windows’ might be, it is important that they be, if ‘accurate’ isn’t the right word, at least true to 
life in some sense. I accept the caveat; it is of course absolutely worth noting that, isolated from 
verisimilitude, simple accessibility is no advantage.  
I should not overstate any of these advantages. There is empirical evidence that the effects 
of engagement with characters in fiction, while significant to moral perception, is less so than 
actual engagement with, e.g., people of different racial and ethnic groups.10 None of the 
advantages above is meant to suggest that engaging with literature is better on the whole for 
																																																								
10			Cf. Vezzali et. al (2011), (2015); Cameron and Rutland (2006); Cameron et. al. (2011); Johnson et. al. (2011), 
(2013a), (2013b).	
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developing moral discernment than engaging with people. But there are situations in which it 
might be the more readily-available or otherwise more advantageous option. 
There is, I think, one last advantage fiction has: 
5. Guidedness 
 
The overall idea here is something like this: literature is a sort of guided engagement with 
complex people and situations. It is the difference between looking at a picture alone and doing 
so with a friend over your shoulder helping you notice things. Unlike the previous example, this 
friend is not merely giving general guidelines for what to seek out in looking at any picture 
whatsoever. Rather, they are helping you see what you ought to see of this picture, and in so 
doing, they are guiding the development of your own capacity to look at a picture and see the 
relevant features of it, in particular. This is the exact faculty of moral perception as Nussbaum 
states it. 
And here there is a new question: who, or what, is doing the guiding? 
I argue that an account of the guidedness of fiction requires an implied author, a concept 
introduced by Booth, and that this is something discovered or ‘constructed’ by the reader from 
engagement with the text. In what follows, I explain what an implied author is, and how it 
provides a foundation for an account of guidedness. 
 
2.3 Authors, narrators, and implied authors 
Following Booth, I distinguish here between the author, the implied author, and the 
narrator of a text.  
Whenever we read or listen to any story, whether it claims to be historical or fictional, we 
do not meet and respond to the single, simple voice that is often implied by current 
theories of “communication”: a “sender” or “source” who transfers bits of information to 
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a receiver. Even the most naïve listener attending with total concentration to the simplest 
tale can, upon analysis, be seen to be recreating and responding to at least three different 
voices: that of the immediate teller, or narrator, who takes the whole tale straight and 
expects the listener to do the same…; that of the implied author, who knows that the 
telling is in one sense an artificial construct but who takes responsibility for it, for 
whatever values or norms it implies…; and the inferable voice of the flesh-and-blood 
person for whom this telling is only one concentrated moment selected from the infinite 
complexities of “real” life.11 
 
The implied author is in some sense an idealization of the flesh-and-blood person: one 
aware of all the implications of the work, and responsible for the overall ethos of the text, in 
virtue of having chosen it and deliberately crafted the work to conform to it. There are a number 
of ways in which this idealization can fail to correspond to the flesh-and-blood author of the 
work, of course: the real person may fail to live up to the implied one, or may have stumbled in 
their craft such that the work itself, and the implied author of it, fail to live up to the real author’s 
aspirations, ethical or otherwise.  
In plenty of cases, the three ‘voices’ Booth talks about can be very similar, but the 
distinction is much sharper in others. Consider the film Sunset Boulevard. Famously, the movie 
begins with the following voiceover: 
Yes, this is Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. It's about five o'clock in the 
morning. That's the homicide squad; complete with detectives and newspaperman. A 
murder has been reported from one of those great big houses on the 10.000 block. 
 
The narrator here, though the audience is unaware of it at the time, is actually one of the 
characters: the murder victim, in fact, Joe Gillis. Being a fictional character, Gillis is of course not 
the flesh-and-blood ‘author’ of Sunset Boulevard; he didn’t write it. He’s not the implied author, 
either, though on the surface of it, it might seem as though we’re to think so. He is, after all, the 
																																																								
11   Wayne Booth, The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction. (1988) Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 125 
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one delivering the story. As the narration at one point puts it, if the viewer wants to know what’s 
happened to lead to this murder, they’ve “come to the right party.” 
But, as a film critic might tell you, there are certain themes and motifs and other 
conveyances of Sunset Boulevard that are not directly given by Gillis. He doesn’t point out to the 
audience, for example, that ‘Sunset Boulevard’ itself is a metaphor as well as the literal location 
of the story’s events. There is another force at work here, apart from the narrator.  
The separation between narrator and implied author is even clearer in famous ‘unreliable 
narrator’ cases, when the narrator is conveying information in a way that the audience is 
eventually supposed to recognize is not quite ‘true.’ The untruth here isn’t merely that, like Gillis, 
they are saying things that are false in the real world, such as that there was a murder on a 
certain night in a certain place called Sunset Boulevard and so on. Rather, in unreliable narrator 
cases, the narrator is conveying information that is in some way untrue even in the world of the 
story. J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye is narrated entirely by the main character Holden 
Caulfield, one of literature’s classic examples of unreliable narration. We get the sense 
throughout the book that things are not quite as Holden sees them, despite the fact that his 
narration is omnipresent and never directly contradicted by any other narrative voice. The fact 
that the world of the story is independent of Holden’s interpretations of it allows for this sense. 
And that gap can be conveyed to the reader because the implied author of the text is distinct 
from its narrator.  
Of course, I have not yet said why the actual, flesh-and-blood author of the work cannot 
fill this role. Why must the entity distinct from the narrator in this way be an idealization of the 
actual person, and not simply the person? Surely an explanation with only two entities is to be 
preferred over one with three, ceteris paribus.  
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As it happens, however, all else is not equal. There are ways in which the unidealized 
author might separate from the implications, messages, and themes of the text itself. For one, 
they may not always recognize what themes, motifs, and implications there are, nor have 
intended some of those things to be present in the work. Secondly, there may be dissonance 
between the ethics or values implied by a work and those actually held by the author, whether 
due to a misfire in writing, unconscious bias, or some other factor.  
This gap, between what is in fact “in the work”—what implications it contains, what 
overall ethos it has, and so on—and what the actual person who wrote it thinks is there or meant 
to put there, demands bridging. If it is possible that there could be such a gap, then it is possible 
that a work could itself guide in a way that the actual author does not know it does or does not 
mean it to—and it would be very peculiar to attribute such ‘guidance’ to the flesh-and-blood 
person in such a case. A guide worthy of the name, after all, knows where they are going and 
what they are showing the guided. But if it is possible that the flesh-and-blood person does not 
know this, then the flesh-and-blood person cannot be in the role of guide. This is why we turn to 
the ‘implied author.’ The idealized quality of the implied author means that the ‘gap’ is now 
conceptually impossible: if something is implied in the work, then the implied author knew it and 
did it on purpose. What the implied author ‘thinks’ or does or guides us to is determined only by 
the content of the work itself (and perhaps, for interpretive assistance, relevant historical 
context).12  
																																																								
12     This applies even in cases where we make interesting judgements of a work to the effect of ‘it didn’t live up to its 
potential.’ I think there are a number of ways we could parse such a judgement using the conceptual resources the 
account offers: something like this could mean that we have a feeling the flesh and blood author probably aspired to 
more than the work delivers, that the implied author is not a very good one, that we ourselves approve of some (e.g. 
plot-structural) qualities of the work but think that something in the delivery was flawed, or perhaps all of these 
things at once. 
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Positing such an entity importantly allows the process of engagement that produces 
guidedness as well as, one might argue, a distinctive part of the aesthetic experience of, say, 
reading. An audience does not, in general, merely passively absorb what they are being shown. 
They engage with it. This is a process that might involve such things as having emotional responses 
to the goings-on, trying to figure out what is going to happen next, making judgements about the 
actions of the characters, and so on. And these activities do not arise out of nothing; in order to 
have emotional reactions, one must in general be to some degree invested in what is going on. 
Trying to figure out what happens next involves grasping clues presented in the narrative and 
making predictive judgements about these, combined perhaps with what one knows about the 
cast and the scenario, perhaps even the genre. And making judgements about the actions of the 
characters involves picking out features of those actions, the context in which they are 
undertaken, traits of the characters’, well, characters, and so on. 
But all of this is by nature a rigged enterprise, to put it starkly. Because someone has set 
out all there is to know about any of these things: all the reasons one might have to praise or 
condemn a character or action, to feel pity or indignation or sympathy, to suppose that a 
character is likely to do one action instead of another, and so on and so forth. The (implied) 
author has in fact implicitly invited certain predictions or emotional responses; in some instances 
these invitations may be more like demands, given their strength. This can all be done more or 
less well, but in even the most careless case, some details are drawn to our attention and others 
are obscured, and it is not we the audience who decide which are which. 
Sometimes, it is also not the flesh-and-blood author. Because of this, it makes sense to 
speak of what the implied author is doing. And if the implied author is the entity it makes sense to 
talk about in talking about what invitations or demands a work issues and how we engage with it, 
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then it’s the implied author (derived from these features of the text) we should talk about when 
talking about guidedness.  
We can therefore have an account of guidedness that need not name the real author the 
guide, nor care much about what her ‘intentions’ were, except perhaps as a matter of causal 
explanation for something. This, even anti-intentionalists like Wimsatt and Beardsley allow for.13 
By being located with the implied author, the guidedness of a fiction need not rely on any 
particular assumptions about how the meaning of a work is determined—either the staunch anti-
intentionalist or those perfectly happy to allow authorial intention a major role in determining 
meaning can permit such an account, because they can both allow for the existence of an implied 
author, contained entirely within the bounds of the text and the reading.14  
For present purposes, getting into the weeds of the intentionalist/anti-intentionalist 
debate isn’t necessary. It is enough to acknowledge the conceptual possibility that an author 
might imply in a text something they didn’t mean to, or that themes might emerge in the text 
which they did not intentionally put there, or that they might seem in writing to be endorsing 
some view that they actually do not, and would in fact disavow. In such cases, it is the implied 
author, the one who makes no errors in writing, who intends for everything that is in the text to 
be there, and everything that is not to be absent, that we talk about when we talk about the 
invocation of symbol or metaphor or message, not the flesh-and-blood person. In many cases, the 
actual author and implied author may be much the same, but because of cases in which they 
come apart, it makes sense to talk about implied authors in instances like this, when concerned 
with interaction with a work of art. 
																																																								
13   “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946) 
 
14     Presumably, the intentionalist will care a great deal about the connection between the implied and real author, 
and the anti-intentionalist will not. 
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2.4 Implied authors and guidedness 
So how does an implied author guide moral perception? The answer to this question is at 
least partially going to be about techniques: how a work highlights or occludes features of a given 
picture has a lot to do with what language is used, and so on. Booth’s account of these techniques 
is detailed and interesting, if perhaps a touch beyond the scope of our interests here.15 But 
beyond questions of literary conventions, I think there’s also a question lurking about the 
‘relationship’ between the implied author and the reader.  
As there are in some sense three ‘speakers’ for any given text, there are also three 
‘listeners’: the audience on one level accepts the telling as “true” in the same straightforward way 
the narrator tells it as such. There is also a flesh-and-blood person doing the reading or viewing, 
and lastly an implied reader. The idea on a broad level is that this implied reader is in a sort of 
exchange with the implied author. This exchange is a form of guidance, undertaken in a range of 
possible circumstances from the near-dictatorial to the peer-like.  
Worth noting, however, is a difference in these two distinctions. The distinction between 
author, implied author, and narrator is meant to be real, and to explain gaps between flesh-and-
blood authorial intention and the actual content of a work. The distinction between the “three 
readers,” on the other hand, does not imply that I in fact become three entities instead of one in 
the act of reading. It’s much more metaphorical as I mean it here–there are simply three 
different modes under which I might interpret a text: I might care about what is literally true in 
it, or what is implied by it. I might be fully engaged or entirely bored and missing details as I go, 
and so on. That I am tracking separately what is told to me as well as what I think of it, or that I 
																																																								
15    But see Booth 161-196. 
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might be affected by flesh-and-blood circumstances in ways that aren’t ideal for my engagement, 
are plain facts that do not divide me into three people.  
The point here is that, typically speaking, the exchange we’re concerned about when 
we’re talking about guided moral perception in fiction is on one end what the implied author is 
saying, and on the other end what’s being picked up by a properly receptive reader. One who 
isn’t distracted, one who is paying attention to what is implied as well as what is literally said, etc. 
This is all that’s meant by ‘implied reader.’ 
In some works, the implied author is quite easily accessible to a reader: the implied author 
of Aesop’s fables, for instance, makes a very direct impression, with its simple characterizations 
and descriptions, and straightforward directing of attention. Implied-Aesop even in most cases 
directly tells the reader what he wants the reader to take away from his stories. We can suppose 
there is little if any separation between Aesop and Implied-Aesop (or between either of them and 
the narrator of a fable), as it would be difficult for him to be mistaken about or unaware of the 
nature of his works. It takes little labor for the reader to recognize the implied author, to connect 
the rhetorical devices and metaphors and so on to a sort of ethos, to figure out where they’re 
being guided, how, and to what end.  
In other cases, it will not be nearly so apparent. I certainly do not mean to suggest that 
what the implied author is up to will always be clear; some writers go to great lengths to make 
their works difficult to interpret, and if they’re good at this it might be challenging to get a 
coherent sense for what the implied author’s up to as well. But most works are at least not so 
abstract as to make this exceedingly difficult, and evidence can be adduced for interpretations, 
they can be compared against one another, and so on, even in the most difficult cases.  
This does lead to an epistemic worry about circularity, however: it seems in some sense 
that in these difficult cases, our interpretations of what the implied author is doing might be 
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heavily influenced by our existing sense of things. Metaphorically, we might say that if the 
guidance takes the form of obscure aphorisms or vague gestures, we are like as not to read into 
them what we’re already predisposed to see, and this serves very poorly in trying figure out what 
we’re in fact being guided to see.  
It’s true enough that this kind of interpretation, learning to see the fingerprints of the 
implied author, is a skill. Some people will be better at it than others. But like other skills, it can 
be developed, and further development of one’s interpretive ability would lead perhaps to a 
better chance of being able to detect the hand of the implied author in a work.16 In fact I think 
we often welcome this challenge. People with skill at detecting implication, interpreting 
metaphor, and other things of this kind do not derive much enjoyment from engaging with 
overly-blunt and visible implied authors. Likewise, those without well-developed skills of this sort 
would perhaps not be able to make heads or tails of Shakespeare, much less Kafka. But this does 
not imply that the process is inherently circular. As in my reply to the objection to Nussbaum 
above, that one must progress in developing a skill or capacity to be able to get anything out of 
the difficult or advanced cases is not itself reason to think that all one is doing is going about in 
circles. 
Booth characterizes narratives as friends of a sort. Implied authors and ‘implied readers’ 
have a sort of relationship akin to friendship in the Aristotelian sense, and the Aristotelean 
language of evaluation is applicable on this view to the relationship.  
I have some reservations about leaning as far into the metaphor as Booth does, but for the 
moment I’ll make the case for it: 
																																																								
16     Though I don’t address this point at any great length here, the potential obscurity of implied authors is one 
good reason to think there’s a lot of value in reading as a social activity: parents with their children, book clubs, and 
so on. In this way one’s own biases are at least less likely to prevent clearheaded interpretation of a text, because 
there are other people around to correct for those. 
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As is likely familiar, Aristotle divides friendships into three kinds: friendships of pleasure, 
utility, and those that offer both pleasure and utility but are sought for their own sake rather than 
for either of these features. The third is the highest form of friendship, and such friendships are 
important in our moral development.17 
This kind of account is appealing when analogized to the case of the ‘relationship’ 
between implied readers and implied author. The implied reader engages with the fiction, allows 
themself to have a sort of experience in which they are accompanied by a kind of guiding voice, 
which directs their attention here or there, highlights or occludes certain features of the 
happenings being read, seen, or heard. The style of this guidance, and its tone, can vary in much 
the way friendships18 can vary: experts and amateurs relate differently than peers, casual 
acquaintances differently than intimate confidantes. Sometimes the engagements are short, 
sometimes they’re long. Sometimes they furnish the reader with material to think about or mull 
over long after the conversation itself is finished. Perhaps they may return to engage again, to ply 
nuances they had not the first time. At other times and with other friends, the ‘conversations’ can 
be lengthy, but shallow, or barely-tolerable in their banality. So it is with both narrative and 
friendship. 
As associating with our friends influences our character, so does “associating” with a 
narrative in an attentive, sustained manner—the manner required for engagement between the 
implied author and attentive reader.  
The highest values on any one of the scales we have traced will be perceived only in a 
reading that genuinely “listens to the story.” Whether a narrative offers only one kind of 
																																																								
17   Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX. 
 
18				I construe the term ‘friendship’ very broadly, and this seems to be in line with how Booth thinks of it. A 
friendship in this context might be a relationship between a mentor and a mentee, for example, where one is clearly 
the ‘expert’ and the other the ‘amateur’, and the tone of the narrative can reflect this. 
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gift or many, the offer will not even be recognized unless the listener engages in the story 
as story, and that means engaging with the [implied] author […]  So long as I continue to 
read, my whole being is concentrated on “how it will all turn out,” or on “What it will 
turn out to be.”19 
 
This engagement, which when wholehearted leads us to want to know what happens 
next, to become invested enough in the fictional goings-on to want to follow them all the way to 
the end, is what one might call the reader’s buy-in. In some cases, buying into a narrative allows 
us to experience a rich, complex picture, presented for our consumption as the story moves 
along. The circumstances so presented will naturally invite our ethical judgements of characters, 
scenarios, choices, relationships, and any number of other things, because those will be what the 
stories are about. This will also involve an exchange of sorts between an implied author and a 
reader, where the former’s use of language, metaphor, and their choices to include or exclude 
certain details or happenings will imply, deem, or suggest that things are such and such a way, 
and the reader might either take this on board, see as the author sees, reject it outright (and likely 
either stop reading or at least continue to do so at more careful distance), or perhaps be uncertain 
about it.  
Sometimes this process, of buying into the story and in turn being guided by its implied 
author, will be clearly enriching. Nussbaum certainly thinks it is when the right kind of reader 
engages with the implied author of The Golden Bowl, for instance. But there is nothing preventing 
such an engagement from being a rather debased or profane thing indeed. Pornographic 
narratives invite engagement as much as Jamesian novels do, and if those invitations are 
accepted, they guide as all narratives do. And that might well turn out to be the very opposite of 
																																																								
19    Booth, 201. 
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good for our moral perception, its implied author teaching or urging us to see people as objects 
instead of persons, perhaps.  
This is unsurprising on an account such as the one I’ve sketched here: some people make 
for bad friends, the kind whose vicious characters do our own natures no favors. No great shock, 
then, that some narratives are ‘bad friends’ in a similar sense.  
Still others perhaps do not do the kind of moral good Nussbaum thinks James’s works do, 
but are not harmful either. There might be narratives that are simply entertaining mysteries, or 
amusing wordplay, or present interesting puzzles of some kind, that have little effect on our 
discernment either way. But even these are not entirely without ethical implications, and even in 
a rather simple mystery novel, we may be invited to see the hardworking but troubled detective 
as worthy of our sympathy, or, more insidiously, to observe scenes of grotesque violence with 
little more than detached interest.  
Guidedness can be simple and clear, or very subtle. Consider one of Aesop’s fables. 
Generally these are very simple stories, with a moral “lesson” that’s more or less stated outright 
in the course of the telling. Many stories designed for young children are like this: the author may 
invite the reader to see how, for example, some people pretend they dislike something because it 
is beyond their reach, as in the Fox and the Grapes fable. Or perhaps the lesson is that excluding 
others from group activities is bad, and this is brought to the reader’s attention by showing how 
doing so makes the excluded person feel. Even in such simple cases, there’s a sort of guidedness at 
work. The implied author in such cases is taking on an ‘expert’ role, in which they are imparting 
something to the reader, who is taken to be the amateur. The prose techniques, simple sentences 
and direct declarations, are themselves apt to the task of explaining something new to an 
amateur, and the thing imparted is itself so basic as to fit that kind of prose.  
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Even here, the selection of details is important. Fables like “The Fox and the Grapes” 
keep the details minimal, because only minimal details are relevant. It doesn’t matter how old the 
fox is, or whether he has a family, or anything like that. The details presented are the ones we’re 
meant to attend to, the ones we’re being guided to see as relevant. This is likely unhelpful to the 
moral perception of an adult reader, but for young children it makes sense.  
As the faculty of moral discernment grows more sophisticated and nuanced, so do the 
details of the stories that engage us on that level. The relevant features may be many more, 
require a rich and complex background of information about the characters, the world they 
inhabit, and the exact nature of the situation they’re in. Specific details might be enriched with 
metaphors, distinctions may be subtle, prose much more evocative, and the like. So, too, might 
the implied author guide in the manner of a peer instead of an expert. The fundamental exercise, 
however—using the medium to train discernment by guiding the reader’s perception of a 
situation—remains the same. Take an example: 
 
Did Han Shoot First? 
In the original 1977 version of the movie Star Wars, one of the three central protagonists, 
Han Solo, is confronted by a bounty hunter named Greedo in a public location. Greedo 
is armed, and uses his weapon to coerce Solo to be seated, after which they exchange a 
short dialogue. Solo, a wanted smuggler, draws a weapon of his own and to all 
appearances20, shoots Greedo dead.  
 
In the subsequent 1997 re-release of the film, this scene is edited, with additional frames 
added to show Greedo first firing at and missing Solo, with Solo firing and killing Greedo 
in retaliation for this act. An even later version of the film shows both adversaries firing at 
roughly the same time, with Solo's shot hitting, while Greedo's misses.  
 
																																																								
20    See below quotation. Whether or not this was the original intent is disputed by the director, but draft scripts 
indicate only that Solo shoots, not Greedo. 
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What's especially interesting about this case is the justification director George Lucas gave 
for the first edit:  
Han Solo was going to marry Leia, and you look back and say, "Should he be a cold-
blooded killer?" Because I was thinking mythologically—should he be a cowboy, should 
he be John Wayne? And I said, "Yeah, he should be John Wayne." And when you're 
John Wayne, you don't shoot people [first]—you let them have the first shot. It's a 
mythological reality that we hope our society pays attention to.21 
 
I contend that Lucas is here making an argument about framing that presupposes some of 
the above account—he certainly seems to be aware that as director, he is guiding the perception 
of his viewers, in a way with ethical implications. He notes that the different versions of the scene 
have a different moral character, and to have changed (or clarified, if we take his remarks about 
his original intentions at face value) the morally-salient features of the scene to adjust the 
implications it has about Solo's character.  
We can, of course, use the theory developed thus far to take this one step further. As a 
protagonist of a clearly heroic, fairly straightforwardly good-versus-evil kind of story, it's 
reasonable to say that, at least by default, the narrative frames Han Solo's actions as generally 
positive.22 One way to have eased any moral dissonance here would have been to re-frame Solo's 
actions within the narrative: that is, to give the audience reason to suppose there was something 
wrong with his decision to shoot first. If there had been a scene depicting the negative 
consequences of Greedo's death, for example, or if Solo had missed and accidentally shot an 
innocent bystander. But the story Lucas has to tell isn't about these events; this scene is Solo's 
																																																								
21   George Lucas, (December 5, 2015). "George Lucas: To feel the true force of 'Star Wars,' he had to learn to let it 
go". The Washington Post (Interview). San Rafael, CA. 
	
22    It is of course possible to introduce more nuance than this. Narrative techniques may be used to make the 
protagonist's actions clearly ambiguous, bad, or at least not endorsed by the implied author. But in general, 
protagonists are 'good guys' and in the absence of reason to think otherwise, it's likely that the narrative endorses their 
actions. 
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introduction to the larger plot he is about to become a part of. So the more efficient course by far 
is to allow the default presumption of a protagonist's moral rightness to stand, and ease the 
dissonance by changing his actions to make them more acceptable.  
Clearly, Lucas takes whether or not Solo had already been shot at to be a morally salient 
feature of the situation. With such provocation, Solo has acted in the manner Lucas was aiming 
for, and let Greedo have the first shot, which by the narrative's standards is perfectly acceptable. 
So the scene is altered to make it clear that the deadly force is justified, and the narrative moves 
on. The audience’s perception is guided to the relevant features of the situation (who shot first), 
and the conclusion endorsed by the implied author is that, more or less, there’s nothing to see 
here, morally. Certainly nothing to object to, because the story moves right along and leaves 
Greedo behind. 
It’s not my contention that a single instance of this kind of guidance, or perhaps even 
many, will necessarily have a profound effect on a person’s character, particularly not if this 
person has many “friends” of differing virtues and vices. But the thought is at the very least that 
while a person is engaged with a story in this way, something is happening to them—a kind of 
manipulation that may be benign in spite of the word’s connotations, or sinister, or more likely, 
some complicated sort of thing that does well by some measures and not so well by others. 
This kind of effect is unavoidable, in the case of genuine engagement with a story. We 
come to be “occupied” by and with a story—that is, we literally occupy our time with it, and in 
some metaphorical sense are occupied by it; colonized by the thoughts of another.23 At a bare 
minimum, reading the narrative alone makes us think about some things rather than others; and 
we generally do so in the order and manner in which the author’s telling suggests. Further on, I 
																																																								
23    Booth, 139. 
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will argue that this feature of narrative engagement is central to the aesthetic experience of 
reading a book or watching a film, and that in part because of this centrality, how a narrative 
guides us is the proper object of ethical criticism of that narrative. It is of course possible to resist 
this ‘occupation’ to some extent: we can read skeptically and hold our emotions at a distance. But 
even if we do this, if we are reading at all we are occupied with the subject matter before us, and 
if we continue to read for any other reason than bare requirement (for a school assignment, for 
example), then there is at least some extent to which we are being guided.  
And this is, more or less, how the whole process goes on Booth’s friendship account, 
which I’ve here purposed as an explanation of guidedness. Narratives are guiding by their very 
nature: they occupy us when we read, and when we genuinely engage, they do so quite 
profoundly, inviting us to see a certain situation as the implied author does. What these 
invitations are to, and what the guidance leads us towards are, any further than this, particulars 
that have to be determined on a narrative-by-narrative basis. Little else can be said in general. 
But even this gives us a relatively solid idea of how narratives could do what Nussbaum 
believes they do: refine and train our moral perception. If the ‘friend’ with whom we are 
engaging over a specific story guides us to notice certain features of it, and in so doing implies 
that these are the features that matter, and if we are induced to desire more of this activity until 
its resolution, then it’s in some sense unsurprising that we should, if we accept certain kinds of 
invitation, get quite a lot of guided practice with our moral perception. 
 
2.5 An objection to the friendship view 
It strikes me that, though overall the metaphor of friendship and narrative engagement as 
a relation of friendship is quite compelling, there is also a very pertinent, lurking disanalogy. In 
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particular, friendship is reciprocal in a way that the ‘relationship’ between implied author and 
implied reader cannot be.  
There is a sense in which the ‘exchange’ of implied writer and reader involves perhaps a 
loose sense of reciprocity: the text itself is never a fully-explicit thing. There are always missing 
details, things left implied rather than said. To use a familiar example from an entirely different 
literature: it is the reader’s job to supply the information that Sherlock Holmes lacks a third 
nostril. The reader must always furnish some of the details, and only after these details are 
supplied to the story is it complete. Sometimes this reader-given information is substantial, as 
when narrators themselves do not explain very much in their text, nor pronounce on exactly 
what a certain character is thinking. Some narrators are very far from omniscient, and in such 
cases the implied author may be inviting the reader to supply the missing information as well as 
they can.  
But there is a difference between this kind of situation, where both implied author and 
reader must supply something in order for the story to be complete, and reciprocity proper. 
Friendships are not often such an asymmetrical kind of matter as to involve one friend declaring 
the parameters of the relationship and what each party is to provide. There is also a lack of a 
certain kind of responsiveness in a larger sense. Perhaps reading The Lord of the Flies does 
something of a certain sort to me—let’s say it does improve my moral perception, for the sake of 
argument. I on the other hand cannot offer it anything: neither the implied nor the real William 
Golding gains anything from me (and not merely because he is dead). 
Put this way, the point may seem trivial. And yet this reciprocity seems to be such an 
important part of actual friendship that the lack of it here makes it impossible to take this analogy 
completely seriously. 
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It seems to me that we have reason enough to give up the particular use of the word 
‘friends’ here. While there is a certain kind of mutual contribution involved in engagement with a 
narrative—that is, the implied author furnishes some of the details, the guidance, and the 
invitations, whereas the reader supplies the missing details, buys in, and accepts or declines the 
invitations— it isn’t the same kind of thing as reciprocity in the friendship sense. So perhaps we 
can take something of a step backwards, and refer to the implied author’s guiding of the reader 
not as an odd form of friendship but as the projection of and reception to a certain ‘friendly 
voice’, or friendly advisor—by which I mean something like an attempt to get us to see things a 
certain way, given perhaps in a congenial spirit, but not being a reciprocal thing in the manner of 
an actual friendship. 
In making this concession, I want to hold onto a certain kind of evaluative language.  The 
kind of language we use for friendship, loosely-construed and properly analogized, still seems to 
be fitting language for describing narratives in an ethically-evaluative sort of way.  
Consider, for example, the ways we have of comparing friendly relationships. Our actual, 
flesh-and-blood friends might guide our moral perception, too. They might have some particular 
insight, and convey it to us by teaching us. Perhaps well, or perhaps in a way that is overly 
sanctimonious or preachy. Or perhaps they might guide as moral peers—we might discuss a 
particular moral dilemma of ours with them for a chance to get advice from an outside 
perspective, without either party presuming any kind of expertise. Or perhaps, if we should have 
an oddly-Socratic friend, she might assume a position of naivety to our expertise and ask for a 
consult, or present something she’s observed from a position of extreme humility.  
These ways of talking about how friends might engage in guiding one another’s moral 
perceptions are very similar to how we might talk about a ‘friendly voice’ in a narrative doing so. 
The friendly voice might take the tone of the expert conveying information to the neophyte, offer 
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their invitations or issue their demands for certain responses with a distinct authority. Or they 
might speak with the tone of a peer, their guidance the much more humble endeavor of 
presenting us with pictures, occasionally pointing out some features rather than others or issuing 
invitations more modestly or subtly. Perhaps there might even be expert friendly voices who have 
so perfected the arts of subtlety that the guidance can all but seem to disappear, when in fact they 
are very much nudging us in some direction or other. In any case, the parallel language to friends 
is helpful in describing guidance—and therefore in getting at what I think ought to be the crux of 
a least a good portion of ethical criticism. This need not be the only useful way of talking about 
guidance, but surely it is a useful way. 
I also contend that such language allows us to speak just as well of the effect a narrative 
has on us while we are engaged with it as well as those it may have after. Like a conversation with a 
friend, the in-progress effects may have ethical dimensions distinct from those of the friendship 
taken as a whole, as we revisit and think about it later and so on. As sketched earlier, the 
consequences of such engagement after it is finished are also ethically evaluable in a way that 
pays due respect to the intuition that something about what we engage with has an effect on us 
without resorting to knee-jerk and implausible consequential claims like “violent media makes 
people violent.”  
If one of our friends is disposed to violence, this is of course a mark against her. But there 
may be other virtues she has that influence us more, and of course we may have other friends, 
and the effects of her friendship upon us are complex. It is unsurprising when we think about 
narratives this way that there is not much evidence of a correlation between the consumption of 
violent media and violent behavior. And that much we can say while still allowing for the fact 
that certain kinds of violence in media may count against those narratives in an ethical sense. 
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2.6 Criticizing guides 
On this account, there are two broad ways that one might ethically criticize the way a 
work guides perception. The first is that, to some extent, the work fails in its attempt to guide by 
failing to engage us the right way, where this failure is at least partially for an ethical reason.24 
The worst cases of what Tamar Szabó Gendler refers to as imaginative resistance fall into this 
category.25 If a book tries to engage us in a world where one of the assumptions required for buy-
in is that torture as a means of revenge is a good remedy for burgeoning trust issues between a 
married couple26, some of us are going to be unwilling to go where it is taking us, because it is 
taking us somewhere our ethics will not, so to speak, allow us to go. Interestingly, this sort of 
ethical failure in a work can also be an aesthetic failure; the work fails to engage because it fails so 
badly at getting the ethical dimensions of a situation right. 
I should note here that this is an ethical criticism by its nature, but only a correctly-
applied one sometimes. It might be, for example, that a particular narrative triggers resistance 
from someone, but this resistance is because that person holds very incorrect views about, say, 
the value of the lives of homeless people. Such a person could encounter imaginative resistance if 
a work portrays such people sympathetically, and they could in fact make an ethical criticism of 
the work, in the sense that it would be a criticism that was based on an ethical feature of the 
narrative. But of course this criticism points out no actual ethical flaw in the work, because the 
critic has got the wrong end of the situation, morally speaking. Likewise, if it turned out that 
revenge-torture just was ethically good, then my ethical criticism of “The Wringer” would be a 
																																																								
24     There may, of course, be works that fail to engage us or earn buy-in simply because they are boring, or trite, or 
not to our interests, or something like that, where this has nothing to do with their ethical character whatsoever.  
 
25     Tamar Szabó Gendler, “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.” The Journal of Philosophy 97 (2), 2000. pp. 
55-81. 
 
26    This is an only-slightly-flippant way of describing the end of F. Paul Wilson’s “The Wringer.”	
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genuine, but not correct, criticism. That is, I would be making the right kind of argument, but my 
faulty premise would be leading me to an incorrect conclusion, and what I was pointing to would 
be no real ethical flaw. 
The other sort of way we might criticize a work’s guidance is if it succeeds in getting the 
reader’s buy-in, but it turns out that the guidance itself is flawed. Perhaps a less conscientious 
version of a TV show like House of Cards or Breaking Bad would be like this. These programs are 
both notable for having protagonists that are not what anyone would describe as “good people,” 
but portraying them sympathetically; in fact to the point where members of the audience want 
them to succeed in their schemes, or avoid punishment, and so on. Of course, these narratives 
also make use of storytelling techniques that keep the viewer aware of the fact that the 
protagonists are awful people, but supposing that layer of things were missing—and these were 
just wholehearted, entertaining narratives that guided their audiences to see their protagonists as 
clever system-beaters who managed to do what anyone could want to do and get ahead in a 
fundamentally uncaring, corrupt world—we could here criticize the guidance as being bad while 
acknowledging that it was extremely effective. In some cases, works that are ethically terrible 
might even be aesthetically excellent. 
There may be some kinds of ethical criticism that fall in between these types. For 
example, some works might trigger resistance sometimes or to some degree because of ethical 
flaws, but these flaws may be partly mitigated by other virtues, either ethical or aesthetic, such 
that we keep on reading, maybe at slightly less than full engagement, or maybe not. The point 
isn’t that in order to be ethically-criticized on this account, the work must either be so bad as to 
halt engagement completely or so subtle as to keep us from noticing as it guides us somewhere 
terrible—these are just the extreme cases. Most ethical criticism is likely to land somewhere in 
between. 
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2.7 Discerning-with-friends and cognitive triviality 
I have here argued for a distinctive view of the ethical value of engagement with fiction. 
The Discerning-with-friends view holds that engagement with narratives develops and rarefies 
our faculty of moral discernment, via a kind of guiding that puts the implied author in the role of 
‘friendly voice’ to the reader, a role that may well take on an ethical component when the voice 
guides the reader’s perception of situations that naturally invite ethical assessment or judgement.  
This view has implications for how the ethical criticism of narrative works ought to 
proceed: in particular, it is this guidedness and its attempted effects on the reader’s discernment 
that are the proper object of ethical criticism. As these features of narratives are also central to 
the aesthetic experience of reading or watching, the account implies that, far from being 
completely autonomous realms of value, ethics and aesthetics are in the case of narrative closely 
linked: an ethical flaw in guidedness will often, though not always, turn out also to be an aesthetic 
flaw. 
My aim now is to show how this account is not subject to the cognitive triviality objection 
in the way the Traditional View is. 
It is worth noting that the cognitive triviality argument seems to assume that the only 
possible contribution of art to one’s moral edification is in the conveyance of a thesis (or theses). 
Were this true, the fact that the theses are typically quite basic and already known to readers 
would indeed constitute a significant objection. But the underlying assumption here is false. It’s 
not the case that the only possible contribution of art to one’s moral edification is the conveyance 
of a thesis. In fact this isn’t even the most important or likely possible contribution. 
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The Discerning-with-friends view of the role of fiction in moral learning is that 
engagement with a fiction is a way of refining the faculty of moral perception.27 If this is so, it 
stands to reason that there is a corresponding axis on which we might judge a fiction’s moral 
content: how well it does this refining. This has nothing to do with the moral ‘thesis’ of the work, 
and it could well be the case that even works with quite trivial theses manage to present such 
complex and interesting pictures to us that they are very effective at refining our discernment.  
A potential problem crops up at this point. It might well be the case that certain works of 
art could be very good for this kind of refinement, but for practical reasons that have nothing to 
do with the art itself, never actually accomplish this. Suppose all copies of a work are destroyed 
before even one person is able to engage with it. Surely ethical evaluation of the content of the 
work is still coherent, supposing we could come to know what that content was. Likewise, a work 
that might otherwise do very well at this kind of thing could still do very poorly if the audience 
lacks the requisite faculties; as previously discussed, some works require a degree of subtlety to 
already be present in the faculty of moral perception in order to be of much good rarefying it.  
It seems like a bad idea, then, to hinge the ethical judgement of a work of art upon what it 
actually does or does not achieve. For similar reasons, I think it best not to hinge it on what the 
work could achieve in highly specific circumstances. Maybe, for example, someone could write a 
book of fascist propaganda so terrible that at least some people who read it will be repelled by 
fascism and pick up on the morally-salient features the book completely ignores. This of course 
does not make the book good from the ethical point of view. We need something else to explain 
the ethical goodness or badness.  
																																																								
27      The proponent of such a view need not (and I do not) assert that this is the only ethical value fiction might 
have. It is compatible with a range of other views, including Carroll’s clarificationism.  
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Here, some people move to intention, but this seems to be problematic as well. Suppose 
that an author very much intends their book to be an excoriation of fascism, but the fascist 
characters end up in fact portrayed so sympathetically that it has the opposite effect on many 
readers. Or perhaps, for a less extreme and likely more common example, the author intends 
nothing morally to be conveyed whatever. They certainly intend no refinement of the reader’s 
moral perceptions—perhaps they aren’t even aware this is a thing they could intend. It seems 
nevertheless true that a vivid picture, presented to the reader in a certain way, might in fact be 
evaluable on the grounds of what it does to that reader’s moral perception. But in what sense? 
This is where the notion of guidedness comes to the rescue. Every book, whether the 
actual author intends it or not, is an attempt to engage the reader, to guide them to see the 
picture being presented, to highlight or occlude certain features of it. At its most basic, this is 
simply because not every minute detail of a scene can be described. But the decisions an author 
makes about what to describe and what to leave out have implications—the reader’s attention is 
at the very least drawn to what is said. Particularly adept authors can draw attention to the 
absence of descriptions, too, can prompt in the reader questions about what they do not know and 
what is not described. Even in the simplest and most direct cases, though, the reader’s attention is 
manipulated, and thus their perception is guided.  
Of course, I might be taken here to be attempting a bit of legerdemain, for I have said 
now that even if the author does not intend to do so, a work is an attempt to guide, and said 
nothing about how an appeal to ‘attempts to guide’ is at all different from an appeal to authorial 
intention, aside from being a slightly-different word. But here is where the implied author comes 
in: regardless of the flesh-and-blood author’s intentions, it is automatically the case when a work 
guides us to attend to some particular feature of a situation, the implied author did this on 
purpose. The implied author just is, after all, that idealized version of the real person that 
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intended everything in the work to be there, and to do exactly what it in fact does. It is the nature 
of narrative that we should be issued invitations to see something, or that sometimes certain 
emotional responses should be demanded of us, and so allowing for both this and human error, or 
inattentiveness—or whatever else might create a gap between authorial intention and what’s 
actually in the work—requires some other entity to pick up the slack.28 
It is quite ordinary and natural for readers to make various moral perceptions and 
judgements in the course of reading, and because of this, there are grounds for ethically-
evaluating the work. We can say, for example, that Triumph of the Will’s framing of Hitler as a 
glorious leader returning Germany to great global power—its attempt to get the audience to see 
him as such— is morally suspect. Or, if we’re in agreement with Nussbaum, we can say that The 
Golden Bowl, which engages us with the moral and psychological maturation of its lead characters, 
is in so doing commendable.  
Relying for ethical evaluation on how art guides us, what the content is of the picture it 
presents and what features of it are highlighted and which are ignored, means that such 
evaluation is not result-dependent. It could fall flat with audiences for any number of reasons and 
fail to actually guide anyone. And this may well correspond to some deficit in it as the kind of art 
that it is. Failing to engage anyone enough to guide their perception could be a sign of a bad 
story. But this is a separate judgement from what the implied author tries to guide us to. 
So too, does it address the triviality objection, largely by stepping around it. The ethical 
evaluation of a work of art may have nothing to do with its ‘thesis,’ if indeed it has one. Rather it 
																																																								
28     One might think that the real author could still serve this function, provided we stopped caring so much about 
their intentions. See Wolf (2016). I think this approach achieves a lot of the same things, but my intuitions about 
edge cases lead me to favor the implied author approach. 
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can have to do with the picture itself, and what the implied author draws our attention to. What 
they invite us to consider relevant. How, in other words, they guide our moral perception. 
In the next section, I will supplement the Discerning-with-friends view with an account of 
the social imaginary. The point of such supplementation is to give an alternative account of the 
consequences of our engagement with art, one that maintains that there are some morally 
relevant consequences, but that these do not require direct behavioral predictions about 
particular individuals. Because they do not rely on shaky empirical premises about the 
relationship between art and the behavior of particular individuals, such consequences do not fall 
prey to the anti-mimicry objection.	
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3. THE SOCIAL IMAGINARY AND ANTI-MIMICRY 
 
 
The social imaginary, I propose, is essentially the background against which we reason, 
containing our collective commonplace concepts and norms. One way in which the imaginary 
develops and changes is through art. Later, I will argue that the current tendency of ethical 
criticism to focus on individual works and their impact on individual people misses a very 
important dimension of the effect they have, namely their effect on the imaginary. 
First, however, I explicate the concept, and demonstrate that it is both genuinely social 
and genuinely imaginary. That is, I aim to show that the imaginary is distinct from explicitly-held 
propositions, not merely a matter of aggregate background beliefs, and in some sense related to 
what can be imagined. 
 
3.1 Castoriadis and the Imaginary Institution of Society 
The emergence of the concept “social imaginary” is typically credited to Cornelius 
Castoriadis, in The Imaginary Institution of Society.1 It arises in the context of Castoriadis’s critique of 
functionalist accounts of institutions, such as the Marxist account. The details of this critique 
aren’t especially relevant for present purposes, so suffice it to say the following: it is clear, pace 
functionalists, that not every institution corresponds to some kind of basic human need. And even 
if they did, this fact would be insufficient to explain the wide variation in institutions across	
																																																								
1    Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998. 
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cultures; both the variance in essentially similar practices (e.g., marriage), and the existence of 
institutions in some cultures which do not exist in others (e.g., the stock market). 
The proposal is that making sense of these differences (as well as, for example, the 
existence of institutions which do not seem to correspond to actual human needs at all) requires 
the introduction of something else. This other something must capture our sense of ourselves: 
who we are and how we relate, what we expect from each other, and so on. It must be prior to 
institutions, and explain their development. 
And this something, Castoriadis proposes, is the social imaginary: ontologically prior to 
institutions, but expressed in the symbols and functions of those institutions. He also seems to 
think that some human needs are created this way, rather than merely arising from human nature, 
which seems to fit well with some basic observations about how institutions correspond and fail to 
correspond with human needs.2 Something we can draw attention to and think about, but by 
default so low-level as to be invisible in the background of social life. Some parts of this at least 
carry through to subsequent uses of the concept. 
There are a number of such subsequent uses. Social imaginaries play a role in 
explanations of a wide variety of cultural phenomena.3 Even the most extensively-explained of 
these contemporary accounts of social imaginary, however, is in some ways very vague. Here, I 




2    There are not, for example, enough institutions in place that effectively fill the function of feeding the hungry, 
despite food being an unavoidable need for any human. There are, though, plenty of institutions that exist to fulfill 
needs not mandated by biology, and we have to have got the idea that these are needs somehow. 
 
3					Cf. Steele (2017), Vertovec (2012), Bayder-Saye (2016). 	
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3.2 Social imaginaries per se 
 The most precise post-Castoriadis formulation of the social imaginary is given by Charles 
Taylor, who describes it thus:  
…something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may 
entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode. I am thinking rather 
of the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with 
others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are 
normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations.4 ​ 
 
 Importantly, this broad and deep something is not merely some kind of social theory. The 
imaginary is distinct from any particular academic or intellectual view, and it is held by the social 
group in common rather than any mere subset of intellectuals. This gives us the first feature of 
social imaginaries: that they are shared amongst a public.5 ​ 
 Also of note in the Taylor excerpt above is his reference to normativity. The social 
imaginary is normative, both in the sense of containing ‘normative notions and images’ and in 
the sense of itself being normatively evaluable. 
 For an example of the imaginary containing normative notions, consider some of the 
ways things might ‘go on between [people] and their fellows.’ As we conceive of them, 
interpersonal relationships are subject to all kinds of norms, from norms of courtesy to 
straightforwardly moral ones. The broad cultural conception of interaction between men and 
women for example, contains norms of courtesy about who should open doors or walk on the 
																																																								
4     Charles Taylor. “Modern Social Imaginaries.” Public Culture 14, 1 (2002). 91-124. (106) 
 
5     What constitutes a public is itself an interesting question, though somewhat beyond the scope of this paper. 
Those interested in a discussion may find Warner (2005) helpful. 
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street-facing side of the sidewalk, and so on.6 Or take norms of competition: we usually take it 
that while opposing sports teams on a field can in some sports be in a lot of pretty rough physical 
contact, out-and-out brawling, or attempts to intentionally injure another player, are morally 
proscribed, and not just proscribed by the rules of whatever game.  
 Our general understanding of relationships between employers and employees has all 
kinds of normative dimensions. Ceteris paribus, we expect employees will acknowledge the status 
difference in some ways, perhaps by referring to their employer with a title and their last name as 
opposed to using first names. We do not, generally, expect that they will acknowledge this 
difference by bowing to the employer. Morally, we expect that both parties will behave according 
to basic principles of the kind of relationship it is: the employees will put effort into their work, 
the employer will pay them on time and at a fair rate, and so on. We have a sense for when these 
norms are being violated, when something has gone wrong in the goings-on, even if we don’t 
know, e.g., what the specific terms of the employment contract are.  
 To explain the employer-employee example as I have is perhaps to make it sound more 
intellectual than it really is. It’s certainly not a demand of the social imaginary’s existence that 
every member of a public carries around with them a ready description of exactly what criteria 
must be met in order for norms of employer-employee relationships to be met. This would be far 
too stringent a demand. What’s important in this case among others is not that people can name 
the conditions, but that they can in fact navigate such a relationship. To put it as Taylor does:  
The understanding expressed in practice stands to social theory the way that my ability to 
get around a familiar environment stands to a (literal) map of this area. I am able to 
orient myself without ever having adopted the standpoint of overview that the map offers 
me. And similarly, for most of human history and most of social life, we function through 
the grasp we have on the common repertory, without benefit of theoretical overview. 
																																																								
6    Of course, such norms can fluctuate or fade; perhaps a more prominent example might have to do with rules of 
courtesy regarding which exchanges are fine to have via text message, which should be phone calls, and which still 
need to be had in person. 
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Humans operated with a social imaginary well before they ever got into the business of 
theorizing about themselves.7 ​ 
 
 A social imaginary is quotidian. Drawing from it and participating in it do not require 
any special theoretical orientation or skill at analysis. In fact, most of the time its role in everyday 
life goes unnoticed. We pay little attention to how we know who is supposed to open doors for 
whom, or how it is that most everyone seems to think similarly about it, because it’s obvious to 
the point of being what some might refer to as common sense.8 A social imaginary is constituted 
by mundane and ordinary “background”—ideas and information that are not explicitly 
formulated, but serve as “givens” in the navigation of ordinary life. 
 This notion of a background is by nature hard to pin down. It’s supposed to be a mostly 
unarticulated, holistic understanding of “our whole situation,” against which individual practices 
can be made sense of.9 ​  So the background against which we make sense of employment 
practices will include things like common ideas of fairness, labor, obligation, the appropriate 
power and scope of a management, individual rights, social contracts, freedom, and so on. 
Considering this, I suspect that there is no more satisfying way to define or circumscribe it than 
to use phrases like our whole situation or what the world is like.  
 There might well be a lurking suspicion here that my cases are still too theoretical, that 
they are better explained by appeal to statistically-likely propositional beliefs. In such a case, 
there need not be anything either especially imaginary or especially social about these 
phenomena at all. In order to defend this account of the imaginary, I have to say more about two 
																																																								
7   Taylor, 108. 
 
8  		I take it that one may have reasons for resisting the application of the term common sense here, and I certainly don’t 
insist upon it. It’s enough for the point that what’s happening isn’t particularly theoretical or intellectually 
demanding. 
 
9   Ibid, 107. 
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things: firstly, why and how it is that at least some of what we do is best explained not by appeal 
to explicitly-held propositional beliefs, but something in this ‘background’. What’s more, I’ve 
claimed that the social imaginary has a normative dimension, so it had better be the case that 
whatever explanation or example I give include such a thing. Secondly, I’ve got to say something 
in favor of this background being a social, and not merely an aggregate, matter.  
 I think to make the first point—that the phenomenon is in part imaginary—it can be 
helpful to talk about a case in which the imaginary lacks a relevant background concept. Miranda 
Fricker’s work on hermeneutic injustice is especially useful. Quoting from Susan Brownmiller’s 
memoir, she relates the story of a woman named Carmita Wood, who quit her job after 
experiencing what we would today easily label sexual harassment. When she applied for 
unemployment insurance, Brownmiller writes, and “the claims investigator asked her why she 
had left her job after eight years, Wood was at a loss to describe the hateful episodes. She was 
ashamed and embarrassed. Under prodding—the blank on the form needed to be filled in—she 
answered that her reasons had been personal. Her claim for unemployment benefits was 
denied.”10 
 Carmita Wood, importantly, was not attempting to withhold the truth from the claims 
investigator. The problem was that she lacked the conceptual resources to understand her own 
experience. Fricker calls this kind of thing a “lacuna in the collective hermeneutical resource”11; 
the latter term is more or less equivalent to what I am calling the social imaginary. Fricker’s point 
is that such lacunae are disproportionately present when it comes to interpreting the experiences 
of the oppressed; because of social power relations, such people can be hermeneutically marginalized. 
																																																								
10     Susan Brownmiller, In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution. New York: Dial Press (1990). 280-281. 
 
11     Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice. New York: Oxford University Press (2007). 151. 
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The argument is interesting, and I think right, but for my own purposes it is enough to see that 
what’s going on is that Carmita Wood cannot explain her own experience because the imaginary 
lacks the requisite concepts for such an explanation to be possible, much less understood. Of 
course, today’s imaginary includes the resources necessary to explain sexual harassment, and 
over and above that, people often have explicit propositional beliefs about it. But Carmita 
Wood’s problem was something beyond a lack of helpful propositional beliefs. It was that there 
was a collective imaginative lack: the concepts and sense of ‘how we get on with each other’ didn’t 
allow for an interpretation on which her harasser’s behavior was harassment; the best she could 
do was describe being uncomfortable with his ‘flirting.’12  
 To take a fictional case used by both Fricker and José Medina, there is an imaginative 
problem at work in some of the courtroom testimony of To Kill A Mockingbird. Below, the attorney 
for the prosecution, Gilmer, questions Tom Robinson, a black man accused of sexually assaulting 
Mayella Ewell, a white woman. It is clear in the story that Robinson did not assault Mayella 
Ewell; rather, moved by kindness, he was helping Ewell with some work when she attempted to 
kiss him. Not reciprocating her affections, Robinson chose to flee the scene. Ewell was later 
beaten by her abusive father, wounds that were blamed on Robinson, and he now stands trial for 
the assault. 
‘Why were you so anxious to do that woman’s chores?’ 
     Tom Robinson hesitated, searching for an answer. ‘Looked like she didn’t have 
nobody to help her, like I says—’ 
     …Mr Gilmer smiled grimly at the jury. ‘You’re a mighty good fellow, it seems—did all 
this for not one penny?’ 
     ‘Yes suh. I felt right sorry for her, she seemed to try more’n the rest of ‘em—’ 
     ‘You felt sorry for her, you felt sorry for her?’ Mr Gilmer seemed ready to rise to the 
ceiling. 
																																																								
12     Ibid, 153. 
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     The witness realized his mistake and shifted uncomfortably in the chair. But the 
damage was done. Below us, nobody liked Tom Robinson’s answer. Mr Gilmer paused a 
long time to let it sink in.13 
 
 The reason this is such a ‘mistake’ on Robinson’s part is because of the way the social 
imaginary of the time was constituted. It was unimaginable to the white audience that someone 
like Robinson—a black man—should feel pity for a white woman like Mayella Ewell. Even if no 
one in the jury had until that point had particular cause to form any kind of propositional belief 
about this specific thing, whether a black man could in fact pity a white woman (even if she were 
poor and disadvantaged in a number of ways), they all easily grasped what Gilmer is implying 
with his incredulity. What’s more, they’re all in accord with it.  
 Medina writes: 
In this case, I submit that what stands in the way of the achievement of justice in the case 
under consideration goes beyond testimonial credibility: the central problem is not that Tom 
Robinson’s testimonial authority is discredited, but rather, that certain affects and 
relations have been rendered incredible (in fact, almost unintelligible) in that culture; and 
achieving justice becomes practically impossible in that culture until those affects and 
relations become imaginable, until they can be thought meaningfully and those who lay 
claim to them do not become discredited by their very claims. In other words, the key to 
understanding what goes wrong in the interrogation of Tom Robinson has to be found in 
the relation between the epistemic attitudes and reactions depicted and the workings of 
the social imagination. The interrogation stumbles upon something that falls outside the 
social imaginary: a Negro feeling sorry for a white girl. What lacks all credibility is not so 
much Tom Robinson as a knower and informer, but the idea of black pity for white 
subjects in Jim Crow Alabama.14 
 
 So what’s in the imaginary cannot be accounted for merely by explicitly-held 
propositional beliefs. The task that remains, then, is to give reasons for thinking that there is 
something about the phenomenon that is genuinely social as opposed to merely aggregate.  
																																																								
13     Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird. London: William Heinemann (1960). 201. 
 
14     José Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance. New York: Oxford University Press (2013). 67 
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 I think some reasons for thinking so are hinted at in what I’ve already said, but to make 
them more explicit: the social imaginary is not formed in a power vacuum. Its content is reliant 
upon and in turn feeds back into social practice. We can see it operating in concert with the 
judicial system in the To Kill a Mockingbird example; the imaginary’s race-relational contents 
preclude the jury from believing Tom when he says that he felt sorry for Mayella. This and other 
problematic failures of the imaginary lead directly to the verdict that he’s guilty, an instance that 
reinforces biases and misconceptions about, among other things, black male (and white female, 
for that matter) sexuality. Fricker notes that members of oppressed groups are much more likely 
to suffer hermeneutical marginalization—that is, they are much more likely to have experiences 
that are unimaginable or inexplicable with the common stock of conceptual resources. Not 
because those experiences are so unique or arcane as to be naturally excluded, but because the 
workings of power and therefore institutions and social structures are such that it’s sometimes 
even in the interest of the powerful to shape the imaginary to exclude the necessary concepts and 
interpretive resources. And this can be done—not directly, but via institutions like law, 
journalism, education, and so on. To understand what’s going on here as an aggregate of 
essentially-independent reasoners navigating life is, I think, to improperly de-emphasize these 
relations of power and mechanisms of social control and influence. 
 Something else to take away from this: there can be better or worse social imaginaries, 
and the content of those imaginaries will determine our assessments. If, for example, the social 
imaginary was structured in a racist way, like the imaginary in the To Kill a Mockingbird example, 
there’s something worse about that than if it were not structured in such a racist way. That is, the 
social imaginary in the To Kill a Mockingbird case is worse than it would have been if it had 
allowed the jurors to conceive of Tom Robinson feeling pity for Mayella Ewell. Likewise, the 
collective hermeneutical resource Carmita Wood had access to when she was harassed is worse 
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than it would have been if it had contained the resources necessary for her to identify her 
harassment as harassment. 
 The last point I want to make here is that the theorists making use of social imaginaries in 
their exegetical work all agree on one last property: a social imaginary can and does change over 
time.  
 But the mechanism for this change needs explanation. The kind of widespread change in 
thinking that I am putting in terms of a change in the social imaginary is sometimes explained as 
being a gradual process by which theory infects practice: some new theory is proposed, gets 
circulated and accepted among elites or intellectuals, and gradually seeps into the “popular” 
imagination if it does very, very well for itself.15 While I think this trickle-down model probably 
works in some cases, I don’t actually think this is how it goes most of the time. Or at least, it’s not 
unless the method of transmission from “elites” to the public is spelled out in a very broad way.  
 Taylor notes something like this in an observation which is never brought up again: 
I speak of imaginary because I’m talking about the way ordinary people “imagine” their 
social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms; it is carried in 
images, stories, and legends.16 
 
 Images, stories, and legends are hardly the same as the social theories of the elite. It’s 
certainly true that theory can be taken up by the creators of art, but it can just as easily be that 
artists express something else. In either case, I think the impact of these has been occluded by the 
literature, which tends to focus on tracing the intellectual history of ideas-as-theories, and elides 
past the ways in which they’re popularized. This is an occlusion I would like to fix; I think doing 
																																																								
15    Taylor, 106. 
 
16    Ibid, emphasis mine. 
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so has important and potentially controversial implications for an ongoing debate about the 
ethical evaluation of art. 
 
3.3 Social imaginaries and change 
 It seems to be a relatively well-accepted fact that images, stories, and legends can induce 
certain kinds of change in the way individuals conceive of the world and their place in it. We 
speak of the kinds of books that can change our lives, of movies that make us think. Educational 
theorists push for greater diversity and inclusion in children’s literature on the basis that children 
who can “see themselves” in characters with certain jobs or positions or even with certain friends 
find it easier to think of their own possibilities as including those options.17 There is a body of 
empirical psychological research on the benefits of literature on children’s and adults’ views 
about such things as inter-group friendships (where the groups are, e.g., race, ability, or gender-
based).18  
 Less easy to research or pin down is how this kind of thing might work in a social 
imaginary sense. It may sound stranger to say that there are books that changed a country or 
culture or generation.19 If there are such books (or films, or plays), they are exceptional in their 
influence. And while such exceptional stories are important, I don’t think that the only way of 
changing an imaginary with images, stories, or legends requires an individual work of staggering 
influence. If I’m right about that, then parsing Taylor’s claim will not be as straightforward as 
taking the individual case and applying it to a group of people rather than a single person. This 
																																																								
17    See for example Hood (2016), Epstein (2017), Montalvo (2016), but examples are as easy to find as a simple 
Google search. 
 
18    Cf. Vezzali et. al (2011), (2015); Cameron and Rutland (2006); Cameron et. al. (2011); Johnson et. al. (2011), 
(2013a), (2013b).  
 
19    Though there may in fact be some. See Gierzynski (2013).	
	 61	
seems to track; the imaginary isn’t quite the same thing as “what an aggregation of individuals 
thinks,” and so accounting for how it changes has to be something slightly different from 
accounting for a change in the way an aggregation of individuals thinks. 
 Supposing that this is so—that change in the social imaginary via images, stories, and 
legends is not, in fact, a matter of very many instances of a single story changing the way an 
individual person thinks of something—there are (at least) two things to clarify. Firstly: what is 
meant by “images, stories, and legends” in this context? Secondly: assuming that the imaginary is 
more or less what I’ve argued it is, with the features I’ve argued it has, what does it mean to say 
that it is “carried” in images, stories, and legends, and how does this help explain the possibility 
of change in the imaginary via these same things? 
 I think Taylor is aiming at something quite broad when he refers to images, stories, and 
legends. Certainly it doesn’t seem like he is referring to the written word alone, nor only to visual 
representations. I don’t think there’s any principled reason to limit ‘stories’ to the fictional—how 
we recount history is in fact something he believes is influenced by the imaginary, for example.20 
Legend is an interesting word choice; in keeping with the social imaginary’s origin with 
Castoriadis,21 I think it is fair to include for example religious myths alongside the likes of urban 
legends or fairy tales. The result seems to be a grouping of things that includes both the (at least 
mostly) factual and fictional, the visual and aural, narrative and non-narrative, though all the 
things I’ve mentioned are cultural artifacts.  
 This seems to be what the note comes down to: the social imaginary is carried in artifacts 
of culture that are not themselves institutions, though they may be produced by or used by an 
																																																								
20    Taylor, 92. 
 
21    Castoriadis uses lengthy religious examples when explaining what the imaginary is, and seems to take for 
granted that religion is one of culture’s richest sources of symbols, and also one of its most prominent institutions.	
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institution, as is obviously true of at least some religious myths, for example. This understanding 
of what Taylor means has the benefit of fitting Castoriadis’s characterization of the imaginary as 
in some sense prior to institutions, but also influenced by them: some of these artifacts would 
have influenced the development of institutions, while others would be produced by or reinforce 
them. To use a religious example: stories of the life of Christ influenced the development of the 
institution of the Catholic Church, which in turn gave rise to further images, stories and legends 
that ended up influencing the imaginaries of some cultures. This isn’t to say that it is only such 
stories of the life of Christ that determined the development of the Church, of course: the 
development of any institution is bound to be enormously complex and rooted in the historical 
context in which it occurred. But it would be absurd to say that the stories had no or negligible 
effect on the form of the religion, and this seems sufficient for the point. 
 It’s fairly clear, then, that when it comes to the imaginary, what we should focus on are 
the cumulative effects of plural images, stories, and legends—that in fact the plurality of the list 
indicates a plurality per imaginary, and that the scale of the imaginary is such that change in it is 
most likely to be the result of a large pattern of change in the images, stories, and legends, rather 
than one transcendent cultural artifact. That doesn’t rule out the possibility that some 
extraordinary works could, by themselves, have sweeping effects on the imaginary, but explaining 
change in the imaginary via images, stories, and legends certainly does not require such works. 
 It may seem premature to talk about change in the imaginary via images, stories, and 
legends. After all, Taylor uses the term carried, which doesn’t necessarily imply that any change 
occurs at all. I take it that it’s fairly obvious that social imaginaries change—we do not have the 
same concepts of e.g. gender relations as existed in 1776. But just because the imaginary changes 
somehow doesn’t mean the images, stories and legends have to have anything to do with it. It 
could be that ‘carried’ implies a certain kind of determination: that the content of the images, 
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stories, and legends is determined by the existing social imaginary, and can at best show us what 
we collectively already think.  
 I don’t doubt that sometimes this is what they do. But if this were only ever what they did, 
they would be incapable of challenging us or changing our minds on much of anything. Yet it 
seems plainly obvious that these things can sometimes change our minds in the individual case. It 
also seems clear that some images, stories, and legends do not merely conform to the existing 
social imaginary—works of art that don’t, for example, are often praised for this quality, and 
sometimes derided for it. Some of the most famous and acclaimed stories in the world are critical 
of the ‘general view of things’ contained in the social imaginaries of the time they were written. 
The images, stories, and legends available to us are capable of more than simply reflecting the 
social imaginary back at us, or showing it to someone from outside it. They to some extent must 
also be capable of carrying it forward, of playing at least some role in change in the imaginary. 
This role is the basis of my answer to the anti-mimicry argument.  
 
3.4 The social imaginary and anti-mimicry 
 Recall that the anti-mimicry argument was the argument that the typical moral-
evaluative language about what good or bad fictions might induce in audiences rests on spurious 
empirical assumptions that don’t seem to be borne out. That is, the anti-mimic takes issue with 
claims of the form “work of art A will cause people to X, and X-ing is bad.” Sometimes this claim 
is left implied, as I think often happens when the critique is that A “glorifies” X, but in either case 
it is the target of the anti-mimic objector. 
 Such simplistic behavioral predictions about the consequences of art seem plainly false. 
On the other side of the coin, it seems equally unlikely that exposure to morally praiseworthy art 
has the direct behavioral consequence of making people do praiseworthy things. But perhaps this 
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straightforward, oversimplified way of understanding the consequences of our engagement with 
art can be modified. It is an empirical truth that fiction is rarely if ever directly action-guiding in 
the way these predictions suppose it is.22 But it doesn’t follow from this that there are no ethical 
consequences of art. 
 In this section, I will argue that there are in fact important moral consequences for how 
we interact with art, and that the moral value of art has an (indirect) impact on how moral we 
are. I do this by appeal to the social influence of art, rather than its effect on individuals, and the 
consequences I will outline are indirect, not necessarily behavior-guiding, and therefore not 
subject to the same spuriousness objection as the consequence-centered position outlined so far.   
 As traditionally conceived, both so-called consequentialism and anticonsequentialism 
trade in generalizations about what particular works of art will do to individual people. If we 
want to be maximally charitable about a vague claim like “violent video games make people 
violent,” it’s best read as a generic statement, of a kind with “mosquitos carry West Nile virus.” 
That is, it isn’t the wildly outlandish claim that every violent video game (or other piece of media) 
causes violence in every person who engages with it in the relevant way. Rather, this statement 
expresses something like a tendency, disposition, or potential something has. In terms of 
potential, it’s possessed by every member of the group (any individual mosquito certainly can 
carry West Nile), but of course not every member of the group realizes this potential, as whether 
or not any mosquito does carry West Nile depends on contingencies beyond the scope of the 
claim.  
 Typically, when one considers the practice of ethical criticism, what’s brought to mind is 
a certain way of talking about individual works of art and their ethical content as relates to 
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individual members of an audience. Of course, the word “audience” implies a plural, but the 
kind of plural in question is a mere aggregation of individuals. If Mark, Lydia, and Alex are the 
‘audience’ of a showing of Triumph of the Will, any concern for the film’s effect on them is a 
concern for its effect on Mark, its effect on Lydia, and its effect on Alex, and for convenience’s 
sake we may speak of its effect on its audience.  
 Furthermore, there is a certain tendency in ethical criticism to be concerned, indeed, with 
the effects of a narrative on its audience. This sometimes takes the form of claims such as “violent 
movies make people more likely to be violent” or something of this nature. That is, the ethical 
critic worries that there might be direct behavioral consequences on an individual audience member 
(or many individual audience members, as the case may be).  
 In the absence of such direct, empirical reasons to be concerned with the ethics of 
narrative works, ethical criticism, if it is to be concerned with consequences at all, will have to 
rest on something else. I propose that a much better way to think about the significance of the 
practice is to put it in terms of the imaginary: while the Plato-esque moralist might be wrong 
about what exactly the harm is in vicious narratives, it’s not the case that we should thereby 
conclude that there is no harm at all. Whether or not work of art A will in isolation make individual 
subject S any better or worse off morally is not the only way in which art might have moral 
consequences, good or bad. Rather, we can frame our ethical assessments of works of narrative 
art in terms of their effects on the imaginary.  
 That the civil rights era was marked by morally-important ideological shifts is obviously 
true, but the claim does not imply anything about the behavior or even ideology of any particular 
individual, and is not defeated by noting all the individuals who failed utterly to be moved by it. 
Analogously, what I’ll claim about art is that it can engender or help engender ideological shifts, 
or maintain the status quo, or do a number of other things, all on a more social level. Like the 
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ideological shifts caused in other ways, these can certainly be morally evaluated, but the moral 
consequences are not dependent on anything about the behavior or even mentality of any 
individual subject. 
 Supposing, as I do, that the social imaginary exists, there can be no doubt that it plays 
some role in a great deal of our reasoning. Certainly we can expect that individual areas of 
expertise may provide new “background” and override the common social understanding of a 
particular concept or group of them. But no one is an expert in everything, and there are times 
and places when even the most individualistic thinker relies on this background.  
 Taylor’s observation that the social imaginary is carried in “images, stories and legends” 
is my metaphorical foot in the door here. 
 If the social imaginary is the background against which we reason and make sense of our 
own social practices, and it is carried at least in part in a culture’s art, then art is inextricably 
bound up in moral reasoning. Consider the importance of moral intuition in moral reasoning; if 
you’re not convinced it’s all that important in moral philosophy, consider instead how likely it is 
that lay moral reasoners rely on it in at least some cases. I don’t have a specific view on the 
nature of what intuitions are, but I suppose it’s very unlikely that whatever they are, they have 
nothing at all to do with the social imaginary. Surely our intuitions, moral or otherwise, are quite 
bound up with how we imagine ourselves in relation to each other, and our latent expectations—
normative and factual—about how things go between us. Even philosophers do not reason free 
of the mire of their social context and background, much as some might desire to.  
 The relationship between art and the imaginary is not one-directional. The imaginary, in 
its role as background, informs the thinking and creative processes of artists, and the works of art 
that result have at least the potential to in turn affect the imaginary. A simple example of this 
relationship: quite a lot of science-fictional economies make use of some kind of currency. It is 
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unlikely that in every case, this particular aspect of the world of the narrative was deliberately 
chosen by the author after a thorough consideration of whether to use currency, bartering, or 
some other basic system of economic exchange. Plausibly, then, the high instance of currency-
based economies in science fiction (where economic systems could be most anything!)23 has more 
to do with background notions of what economies are generally like than any particular decision 
to have a currency-based economy for some other reason. And one more instance of people 
navigating economic transactions in the familiar way is, in some small measure, reinforcement of 
the way the economic transactions are conceived in the imaginary. 
 The first direction here, from imaginary to artist, is I think explained by the account of 
the imaginary itself. The background against which someone thinks has an effect on how that 
thinking goes. If our background understanding of economies tends to involve currency, then it’s 
unsurprising that this is what goes into a narrative where there’s no particularly outstanding 
reason to do otherwise. The author can write with reasonable verisimilitude in their portrayal of 
an economy, and the reader doesn’t have to do any particular work to understand what’s going 
on.  
 The second part is a little trickier to pin down. As previously mentioned, it sounds a little 
odd to say that a single work of art has such staggering influence on such a wide audience as to 
by itself change anything about the social imaginary. Perhaps this is possible in extraordinary 
cases, but certainly the majority of artworks do not achieve this.  
 The move here is to shift from individual works of art to patterns in them. General trends 
in art, in for example the ethical viewpoints we are invited to take by the works of art with which 
we engage, can change the imaginary. They need not do so alone, of course, but it seems clear 
																																																								
23     Perhaps there is an argument to be made here about the constraints of ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ science fiction. But if 
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that they do. The U.S. Farm Security Administration (FSA), formed during the Great 
Depression, had as one of its goals raising public awareness of impoverished farmers. Perhaps the 
most famous artifact of that effort was Dorothea Lange’s photograph, Migrant Mother. It, along 
with works such as Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath, (itself written in part from field notes taken by FSA 
worker and author Sanora Babb) and other works of art at the time focused on this subject 
matter, did much to meet the goal of raising public awareness of the plight of such migrant 
workers—to, in other words, alter the imaginary to include them, and to portray them as worthy 
of sympathy. 
 Adding to the imaginary is not the only way to alter it, however. Suppose, for example, 
that someone makes the argument that putting more women in leadership roles in media is one 
way of promoting gender equality. One way to read such an argument—and I think the correct 
way—is to say that what’s happening in such cases is that the background is changing. In a social 
imaginary that reflects this kind of trend, we should expect to see more acceptance of women in 
actual leadership roles. What we need not see is anyone reasoning in the following way: 
1. I saw this on TV. 
2. It seemed plausible to me. 
3. Therefore, I should think it’s plausible or likely in real life also. 
 
 Neither any individual work of art nor trend need be an explicit premise in anyone’s 
reasoning. That the above ‘argument’ seems cartoonish is partly due to the simplicity of the 
example but in part also because the transition from fiction to real-world reasoning is rarely so 
explicit (and indeed we tend to see it as erroneous when it is!) Rather, the argument that putting 
more women in leadership roles in media is a way of promoting gender equality is best 
understood as saying something to the effect of: enough exposure to this sort of thing will alter an 
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imaginary, and in so doing influence the way people reason about related matters by way of the 
imaginary’s influence on concepts.  
 For a more concrete example, recall the Star Wars case from the previous chapter. The 
edits to the scene, and the reasoning behind making those edits, make it quite clear that the 
implied author of Star Wars at the very least finds nothing morally objectionable about killing in 
self-defense, when that defense is itself from deadly force. This is a relatively common moral 
position, I think, but it’s exceedingly unlikely that anyone arrived at it from watching Star Wars. 
Nor, I contend, would anyone have arrived at the conclusion that killing in preemptive self-
defense is good had the footage remained in its original form. As part of larger patterns, however, 
the difference has significance.  
 The action movie genre, and related genres, often contain significant amounts of 
violence, even deadly violence. But this violence is (usually) undertaken within a specific set of 
circumstances. Violence in self-defense, or against those who have committed heinous atrocities, 
is commonplace among heroic characters in such genres. Violence for the thrill of it, in pursuit of 
wealth, or to coerce people is generally the doing of villains. Violence in service of vengeance 
tends to land somewhere in the middle. This tracks with what seems to be a cultural pattern, 
reflected also in laws and institutions. These two facts are not completely detached: on this 
theory, there is mutual reinforcement between the socially-imagined ‘rules’ or norms for 
interpersonal violence and the media that show various characters abiding (or not abiding) by 
those rules. 
 Supposing that there is something right about this, and that the social imaginary has a 
role to play in moral reasoning, then we have the beginnings of an argument that there are 
ethically-significant consequences of art that do not rest entirely on unlikely behavioral premises. 
Say, for example, that the social imaginary of some group (we’ll say country) is such that they 
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imagine themselves as grouped into harsh class strata where some people in the nation are not 
even fully human. One can imagine how this background understanding would result in deficient 
moral reasoning. Starting from bad premises never helps, even if the deficient information is 
never explicit in the argument. Indeed, it would take a rather epistemically and morally heroic 
effort, we could imagine, to overcome this nasty background premise and reason morally rightly 
in spite of it.  
 Supposing that this view of the imaginary is broadly correct, then we have reason to be 
very concerned with what any given social imaginary is like. Even if, as background, nothing from 
the imaginary explicitly makes it into our reasoning, there is little doubt that concepts and norms 
from it implicitly inform our reasoning and practical deliberation. The broad understanding of 
‘how we get on with each other’ is crucially important to, well, how we in fact get on with each 
other.  
 On this account, imaginaries can, by moral as well as epistemic standards, be better or 
worse. They can, in some instances, be better or worse along these dimensions simultaneously. 
Imagine, for example, a society in which the background understanding of gender relations 
normatively allowed for domestic abuse. Of course such an imaginary would have got something 
wrong in an epistemic sense, about what the truth is, but inherent in this particular epistemic 
wrongness is a moral wrongness as well. 
 If art collectively has the power to reinforce the status quo or to transform it, then we 
have reason to be morally concerned with it. Art that reinforces a bad social imaginary plays 
some role in reinforcing bad moral reasoning, and this is ethically bad.24 Art that subverts a bad 
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status quo or reinforces a good one plays some role in engendering good moral reasoning, and is 
thus (ethically) good. The impact of some individual work of art on the social imaginary is likely 
quite small (though not always!); the primary role here is played by patterns or trends in art that 
are prominent enough to actually shift the imaginary. Neither does it play this role by itself: art is 
often tied up with other things that might change the imaginary, such as social movements or 
resistance to these. I don’t imagine it achieving much in isolation.  
 Nevertheless, individual works of art can be understood as contributing to some change 
or stasis in the imaginary, as being allied to or resistant to social movements, and so on. To the 
extent that they do this, they are morally evaluable for the effects they have—or perhaps it’s 
better to say the effects they would have, if in fact they were taken up in the social imaginary. 
Some of them will be, others won’t. But we can ask if the prescribed responses given by a specific 
work of art would be good or bad if taken up into the social imaginary, and this yields I think the 
right verdicts: if the perspective espoused in Triumph of the Will and similar propaganda films were 
integrated into the imaginary, the results would be (and were) disastrous for moral reasoning. We 
can thus say the film is morally bad for the harm it would do if it became predominant in the social 
imaginary. 
 This might seem to be a peculiar sort of moral assessment. But I do not think it is so 
different from some ways we might speak of, say, the character of a person we know. It could be 
the case that Cliff is in practice a relatively inoffensive person: he in fact commits no egregious 
bad acts, is generally polite and all that. But suppose that Cliff has some truly awful views about 
things; perhaps he is in fact a neo-Nazi, who suppresses his views and does not act in accordance 
with them because of the fear of the consequences of doing so. I think it plausible that we could 
nevertheless criticize Cliff in the following way: if it were even remotely socially acceptable to do 
so, this guy would be expressing anti-Semitic views often, and possibly even acting in accordance 
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with them. Even if he never gets the chance, never once expresses his reprehensible views aloud 
or in writing, we can criticize him for having them, and one way of criticizing him for having 
them is to note what he’d be like if his views were widely enough shared as to be socially 
acceptable. We could of course also simply criticize Cliff simply for having the views he does. But I 
think there is a difference between someone who has reprehensible views they would never act on 
and someone who has reprehensible views that they would, in certain circumstances, act on, and 
so this further type of criticism—that under certain circumstances, Cliff would act in such and 
such a way—is a legitimate criticism of him apart from his views themselves.  
 This is roughly analogous to the way talking about art’s influence on the social imaginary 
works. It is a perfectly legitimate enterprise to criticize art for its (un)ethical features, but a further 
type of criticism is possible—criticism of art’s effect on the imaginary. It is in some sense a 
critique of character, one that makes reference to what would become of the imaginary if it had 
certain ‘traits’, such as anti-Semitism. Importantly, this kind of criticism has a number of 
dimensions. One might think—and I do—that it’s just a bad thing if the imaginary has certain 
bad traits. It just is bad if there’s an anti-Semitic streak to it, regardless of anything that does or 
does not result from this.  
 It is also bad that this trait of the imaginary would lead to at least some people having an 
anti-Semitic streak. After all, the imaginary is the background of reasoning; while it is far from 
impossible that individual people might realize the flaws in the background and take steps to 
ameliorate this unconscious influence on themselves, it’s also the case that some people will not, 
and this is a poor consequence for their characters. 
 As far as behavior goes, what I have to say falls in line with what the empirical research 
actually seems to show: that sometimes, under the right conditions, there is some connection 
between continuous exposure to media of a certain (say, violent) character, and behavior that 
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reflects this character trait. It tracks that sometimes, under the right conditions, a person with an 
anti-Semitic streak may act in ways that demonstrate it. But then again, they may not—the 
connection is not so simple and direct a causal matter as the slogans suggest.25 
 In this way, we can hold that engagement with narrative has some important 
consequences, pace the anti-mimic. The claim that what art we engage with sometimes has some 
effect on what we do is suggested by the empirical research cited earlier: there are limited results 
about what exposure to violence does to individuals, as well as more positive studies of children’s 
tendency to think of out-group friendships as possible after engagement with literature that 
portrays it. But even if this is insufficient justification for making so much hay of the ethical 
quality of art, there are other reasons to do so. It matters, I argue, what the background is 
because of how this affects our reasoning, even in cases where this reasoning does not end in any 
salutary or reprehensible behavior.  
 What’s more, the view does not allege that Triumph of the Will is bad because it alone could 
give the social imaginary an anti-Semitic streak. It is not a call for censorship or a claim that 
some works of art are all by themselves inherently corrupting: people, and the social imaginary, 
are more resilient than that. Only in a context where Triumph of the Will was part of a significant 
pattern would we expect the result that general moral reasoning was worse. But we can still call 
Triumph of the Will a morally bad film: what could we expect to happen to the social imaginary 
and moral reasoning if this film were part of a pattern that was taken up? Clearly, very bad 
things. 
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 Here is a potential objection: what I have said is far too general, and is going to apply to 
too many things. Criticism of the kind in, say, Case 2 from the beginning of this project rightly 
deals in trends in artwork, but not this way. The view I am arguing for seems to imply that, for 
example, any individual instance of a black person being portrayed as a criminal counts as 
grounds for an ethical criticism of a narrative, because if that narrative were taken up in the 
imaginary, the imaginary would have a racist streak. And this is too much—it can’t be that any 
portrayal whatsoever of a criminal who happens to be a black person is an ethical strike against a 
narrative.  
 This criticism seems right to me. I note that, thus far, what I have said is very broad-
strokes, and that I certainly have to qualify it in some way so as to avoid the consequence that 
any portrayal of a black criminal (or a miserly Jew) is a moral strike against a work. 
 To do this, however, I must appeal to more individual traits of a work than I have yet 
done. In fact, I think that the process by which we arrive at something like ‘an idea of what it 
would be like if this were taken up in the social imaginary’ is going to be complicated, and 
involve a number of factors I have not mentioned. Taking the objection case, suppose a film does 
include a portrayal of a black person as a criminal. I can, offhand, think of a few very important 
questions that would help contextualize this fact: 
1. Is ‘criminal’ the extent of the characterization, or is the character in addition to being a 
criminal also a fully-developed, ‘rounded’ character with other discernible traits? 
2. Is the character’s criminality implied or stated or shown to be connected to their race? 
This could include all the criminals in a story being black, for example. 
3. Are there any other black people in the story? If so, what are they doing/in what light 
are they portrayed?  
 
 Even a list of this kind of course is going to miss what might be subtle features of portrayal 
and framing in particular works. But even as it stands, we can begin to see how the account 
avoids the objection. It would indeed be going much too far to say that any portrayal of a black 
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person as a criminal is inherently a moral strike against a work. It is possible to maintain both this 
and the position that we should care what individual works would do to the social imaginary if 
they were part of a pattern taken up. If, for example, the particular portrayal was such that the 
answers to 1-3 were “yes, that’s the extent of the characterization; yes, it’s conveyed that ‘urban 
culture’ is conducive to crime; no, this character’s the only one,” then we can see that the 
portrayal is a moral strike against the work. But if, say, the character is shown to have a complex 
inner life with both foibles and positive traits, it becomes much less likely that the account would 
deem this a moral strike; it would be wonderful if the social imaginary reflected the fact that 
people are complicated and not easily fitted into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ boxes. 
 The point to take away here is that in practice, ethical criticism can be grounded in 
legitimate concerns for the content of social imaginaries—and that such assessment can and 
should be framed in terms of the effects of these features not on any specific individual, but on 
collectives, via the influence of images, stories, and legends on the imaginary. This, I think, 
avoids the problems the Traditional View runs into, and allows us to hold that there are, indeed, 
morally significant consequences of engagement with narratives. 
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4. ETHICAL CRITICISM REVISITED 
 
 
 Earlier, I promised that the account of ethical criticism I was developing would explain 
why my two cases were cases not only of genuine ethical criticism, but of the same type of it. In 
this section, I offer my view’s interpretation of what’s going on in each case, and then show that 
the common features of the explanations suggest that they are indeed fundamentally similar.  
 
4.1 Interpreting the cases 
 Here again are the two cases at issue: 
Case 1: After watching the movie The Watchmen, Penelope and Harpreet disagree about 
which of the characters acted rightly in response to an important moral dilemma. 
Harpreet argues that the film’s villain, Ozymandias, was justified in his actions, and that 
the film got it wrong when it made him the villain. Penelope thinks this is outrageous, and 
that Ozymandias was coldhearted and evil.  
 
Case 2: Daisy and Adam both agree that the heist movie they just watched was pretty 
good. Daisy thinks it would have been better if some of the team members were women, 
though, since it wouldn’t have changed anything fundamental about the story, but would 
have done something to help ameliorate what she sees as a dearth of women in interesting 
action roles in movies generally. What’s more, she sees the continual failure of film to do 
this as a moral failing on the part of filmmakers and major studios. 
 
 Earlier, I suggested that the Traditional View of ethical criticism reasonably explained the 
first of the cases: the film’s treatment of Ozymandias as the villain is evidence of its endorsement 
of a certain moral thesis. Harpreet and Penelope disagree about whether the thesis is true, and 
this is the root of their dispute about the film. 
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 The Discerning-with-friends view does at least as well as the Traditional View in 
explaining the case. It need not be a thesis, implicit or explicit, about extreme utilitarian actions 
that motivates the disagreement. On this view, Harpreet’s dissatisfaction need not boil down to 
disagreement with a thesis about utilitarianism. He could rather think that the film did a poor job 
actually pointing out relevant information, or that the framing of a cold-hearted utilitarian as 
‘evil’ was too simplistic, and elided over extenuating circumstances in an unfair way, and so on. 
There are more options for such disagreements than disagreeing over a thesis or theses, and I 
think this fits well with the natural complexity of the ‘pictures’ films and other narratives give us. 
 It is in the second case, however, that the difference between the views is most stark. On 
the Traditional View, Daisy’s criticism isn’t really the same kind of thing as Harpreet’s at all. 
Assuming the heist film is not in fact endorsing some thesis of the form “women can’t do x,” the 
view runs out of resources to explain the criticism as a criticism of the movie itself. It must be 
that, though perhaps ethical in a broad sense, this type of critique is fundamentally different from 
the first, and Daisy is in fact criticizing the filmmaking industry or something similar. If she 
maintains that her critique is really about the specific movie, she is mistaken in some way.  
 There are possibilities here for the Traditional View. One is to simply hold that people 
making critiques of this sort are in fact doing something somewhat different than they take 
themselves to be doing, perhaps overreaching somewhat in trying to apply a social criticism 
about movies in general to a specific movie. People are, of course, not always right about what 
they’re doing, and so perhaps this is fair enough. Another option is to say that there is sexism 
inherent in such a choice as making the main cast of the movie exclusively male, and that is 
because in doing so the film really does endorse a sexist thesis. This option gives the verdict that 
Daisy’s criticism is about the particular film, by way of ascribing a thesis to it.   
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 I think that, given an opportunity for a different explanation than either of these, we 
should be keen to take it. The view that a movie that doesn’t really have much to do with gender 
is explicitly endorsing a sexist thesis, while not impossible, does seem to be a stretch. What’s 
more, such a view is still subject to concerns about the Traditional View in general. The view 
that Daisy may be making a category error about what she is really doing in criticizing the lack of 
representation in the movie doesn’t run into that particular problem, but ceteris paribus I think we 
should prefer not to ascribe widespread error of this kind to people, assuming there is a plausible 
alternative explanation.  
 I think there is, and I think we get it through the Discerning-with friends view. In 
particular, I think the most productive way to cash this out is to interpret it as a claim about 
guidance and moral perception. A film need not be endorsing a thesis about women can or 
cannot do in order to be individually criticized for its gender representation. It seems to me 
perfectly coherent to say, of a film, that in giving us a picture where the entire team of capable 
professionals are men, with no salient detail that gives a special reason for this, or guides us to 
question it, it presents this situation as nothing particularly worth notice. That in a particular 
story all of the many competent heroes, or board members, or doctors1, are men—and this is 
framed as nothing remarkable or even unusual—is showing us something. And that something, 
like anything else we might be shown by a narrative, is a legitimate target for ethical criticism.  
 Like other guidance, it may but need not be the case that this ethical flaw could turn out 
also to be an aesthetic flaw. If at any point the reader should notice and resist this—“you’re 
telling me not one of these people is a woman?”—it may well cost her engagement with the 
narrative. Also possible in cases like this, though, is that people don’t have this reaction, because it 
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is very easy to see such situations as normal or not worth comment. Indeed, I suspect this is often 
part of what motivates criticisms like Daisy’s. Such examples are cases where critics are taking 
issue not with something that is (at least ostensibly) outside the status quo, like egregiously racist 
jokes, but with something that reinforces the status quo.   
 To make the choice to have, say, an all-male cast in a situation where it would have made 
no difference to the story for some of the cast to be female is to contribute to a pattern in the 
imaginary where the ‘default’ hero-protagonist is a man. And this, I think, is very much the kind 
of thing critics like Daisy have in mind.2 Irrespective of whether this constitutes a legitimate 
ethical critique in a particular case, it is an intelligible one, and intelligible as a critique of that 
particular work. 
 
4.2 A single type of ethical criticism 
 The idea that there is in fact a single type of ethical criticism at work in both of these 
cases is hopefully suggested by the above. To make it more explicit, however, I propose that what 
unites the two under a single heading is twofold. Firstly, the criticism is of a particular work. I 
contrast this with types of criticisms that might be about art, but not about particular works of it: 
critiques about staging, or the treatment of actors, or set-building materials, and the like are not 
critiques about the narratives themselves. Likewise, the broad criticism that films do not do a very 
good job of representing LGBTQ people is about narratives, but not particular narratives, and so 
is also distinct from the kind I am talking about.  
 The second feature of these particular criticisms is that, sometimes, the ethical flaws they 
point out will also count as aesthetic flaws. This is a contextual matter, and may be ameliorated 
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by other factors, but at the very least the potential is there in each case. That is because the 
critiques are critiques of guidance. In both cases, we are being guided to see something, and the 
critic thinks there is a moral failure in this guidance. Harpreet thinks that the implied author of 
Watchmen guiding us to see Ozymandias as an unrepentant villain gets the salient moral features 
of the picture wrong. Daisy thinks that the heist movie’s way of treating the absence of competent 
women as completely ordinary and unremarkable is similarly bad guidance. In either case, 
perhaps contingent upon what the audience is like, such a misstep in guidance could have the 
aesthetically-negative effect of reducing or halting engagement, likely by triggering imaginative 
resistance. We have reason, then, to see these two criticisms as being of the same type, and if my 
account demonstrates the legitimacy of one, it also demonstrates the legitimacy of the other. 
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5. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 While the account was constructed as a means of validating existing practices of ethical 
criticism, and defending it from the objections above, its implications reach further than this, I 
think.  
 Firstly, it has something to say about the contemporarily relevant question of whether it is 
possible to separate art from artist. Suppose we know an artist to be seriously morally flawed. 
What should then be done about their art? 
 I want to set aside a couple of things that my answer is not. First, it is not necessarily the 
complete answer. You might have perfectly good reasons for not, e.g, purchasing anything such 
that royalties would reach an artist whose conduct you object to. These could be entirely 
independent of any judgement about their art, or anything about ethical criticism in general. 
Perhaps it is simply a moral principle of yours that none of your money ever go to someone you 
know to have committed a certain act.  
 Apart from this kind of moral commitment, however, there is an open question about 
whether we ought engage with the work of an artist who is known to have a dire ethical flaw. 
One prominent example is Woody Allen. Should we watch Woody Allen’s films? Can they still 
be counted as good art, and if so, does this separate them from him, such that we can engage 




 What my account suggests is this: given the closeness of implied and real authors, in many 
cases we could expect that the erroneous moral views or vicious traits of an artist will in some 
way manifest themselves in the art. We could reasonably predict this would be more likely the 
closer the subject matter of the work is to the area in which the artist is morally deficient. So, for 
example, it’s much more likely that Woody Allen’s putative flaws of character would show up in 
stories about families or relationships. Taking the Discerning-with-friends view seriously, we have 
reason to suspect that implied-Woody Allen will guide us poorly with respect to such matters. 
 Furthermore, in the event that we should recognize poor guidance of this sort in the 
viewing of, let’s say, Annie Hall, it is unlikely we would even be able to properly engage in the kind 
of way the Discerning-with-friends account says is central to the aesthetic as well as moral 
experience of art. We have reason also to suspect that we would not find the film aesthetically 
appealing, or at the very least that at some point it would trigger some degree of imaginative 
resistance in us. Perhaps there are other reasons we might have to engage: for example, we desire 
to know what happens in the movie so we can point out to a friend of ours what’s wrong with it. 
But these aren’t the reasons we typically engage with art, and even when we do, we do so at a 
greater distance than we would normally, so this is not, as such, a reason to watch Annie Hall in 
the way something might normally be a reason to watch a movie (great plot, interesting 
characters, fabulous cinematography, etc.) I think that, in the case that we do watch Annie Hall 
in full knowledge that its subject matter overlaps at least somewhat with the ways we take Woody 
Allen’s character to be deficient, we likely do so (and are justified in doing so) in a way that is less 
than fully engaged, or, to put it another way, we provide less than complete buy-in.  
 This additional distance, if it is brought about, is brought about because we don’t take it 
that art is completely separate from artist. Or at least not all types of art are. And this seems to be 
a perfectly-reasonable position to hold on the account. It would be stranger for someone who 
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held the Discerning-with-friends view to hold the opposite: that there was no reason to suspect 
something about Woody Allen’s films might be off, whatever might be true of Woody Allen 
himself.  
 Notice that if Annie Hall were the name of a still-life painting, these reasons evaporate. 
Because engagement with still-life paintings is a fundamentally different thing than engagement 
with a narrative, there’s no reason at all to suspect that Woody Allen’s character flaws would 
have anything to do with the experience of looking at a still-life painting he’d made. The account 
suggests that separation of art from artist is fine in this case. So if this is the incorrect verdict, then 
something else (such as the principle about money above), would be a necessary supplement to 
what is offered here.  
 Another, entirely separate, implication that seems to arise from this view is that it isn’t 
only ethical criticism that it could, in theory, legitimize. I think, though it is somewhat afield of 
what I have properly attempted to show, that just about everything I’ve said about ethics could 
be applied mutatis mutandis to epistemology. It seems plausible to me that narrative art encourages 
certain patterns of reasoning, or guides inductive inferences, in a similar way to how it guides 
moral perception and discernment.  
 I also think that a book with shoddy internal logic, for example, is worse aesthetically for 
that fact, at least sometimes. Suppose a mystery novel gave the reader a certain set of clues that 
pointed subtly but clearly to the fact that the butler did it. But then we reach the climax, wherein 
the detective gives her analysis, and at the very end, she lists off heaps of evidence the audience 
was never allowed to see, concluding that it was the maid after all! I suspect the average reader 
would feel cheated by this; they reasoned well, after all, only for the author to ‘cheat’ at the very 
end, making the right answer one that no good reasoner could have come up with. I, at least, 
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would find this to be a worse story for such a contrivance, even if it was otherwise as sublime and 
engaging a work of art as any. 
 These potential further matters aside, however, I hope here to have shown something 
important about ethical criticism. I meant to defend it against two common charges against its 
legitimacy and philosophical grounding, and also to give an account that was as true to its 
commonplace practices as possible. By combining an account of the social imaginary and the 
Discerning-with-friends account of moral ‘learning’ from fiction (and its moral value), I have 
shown that the practice of a certain kind of ethical criticism both is and ought to be rooted in 
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